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CHAPTER - I 
INTRODUCTION 
"The accumulation of allpowers, le«^islative. Executive 
and Judicial, in the same hands, whether of one, a few 
or many, and whether hereditary self-appointed or 
elective, many 3ustly be pronounced the very defintion 
of •TYRANNY'" 
-MADISON 
The above said lines contain the naked truth 
that anarchy would be the ultimate result whenever and 
wherever the doctrine of 'Separation of Powers' is either 
ne9lected partially or ignored wholly. The very reason lyincj 
behind such truth has been put very intelligently by Lord 
Acton in a few words - "Power corrupts and absolute power 
corrupts absolutely". 
In this backc^round, one may proceed to assert 
that an independent judiciary is essential, rather 
indispensable, to every democratic State, 'Justice' is the 
very first objective enshrined in the Preamble of our 
constitution. The primary instrument of Justice is the 
Judiciary.-'- It acts as anumpire while deciding disputes 
1. P.B. 
Constitution 
Mukherji, The critical/problems of Indian 
, 94 (1967). 7 
between the persons as well as between federatin<^ units 
interse or between 'person & state' or 'Units & State'. 
It interprets the constitution- the supreme law of the land 
and acts as its protector and guardian by keeping all 
authorities within its bounds.^ 
These enumerated functions can only be performed by an 
•authoritative, independent & impartial' judiciary. The 
si9nificance of an 'Independent Judiciary' in a Democracy 
has been aptly stressed by Justice Kuldip Singh as follows : 
"The role of the Judiciary under the constitution is a 
pious trust reposed by thepeople. The Constitution and 
the democratic polity thereunder shall not survive, the 
day Judiciary fails to justify the said trust. Of the 
Judiciary fails, the Constitution fails and the people 
mi9ht opt for some other alternative."^ 
Hence, anindependent judiciary is an 
indispensable requisite of a free society. Independence, 
here, means freedom from Executiveor political interference 
in judicial functions. 
But, do we have, in India, an independent 
judiciary in real sense? 
A sincere attempt to reply this question would 
2. M.P. Jain- Indian Constitutional Law, 120 (4th Edn.) 
(1987) 
3. S.C. Advocates - on - Record Assn. V/S Union of India, 
A.R.-1994, SC, P.398. 
involve consideration of enumerable factors and the First as 
well as foremost one is ret^ ardintj the 'composition of 
Court'. This fact has the stron9 support of Mr. P.B. Menon 
when he expresses his concern to the cause of impartial 
judiciary in followin9 lines : 
"Independenceof judiciary is a matter of vital concern 
not only to Judyes and Lawyers but also to the common 
people. If the judyes are not independent in the 
discharge of their functions, the casualty will be the 
rule of law, resulting in confusion & disorder". 
Thus, 'Appointment of Judyes' to hiyher courts 
merits special consideration. In view of the special role, 
assigned to such courts under the scheme of our 
Constitution, it is essential that only persons of the 
hiyhest ealihre be appointed judyes of the courts and that 
no other factor except that of merit alone should weiyh in 
the matter of appointment. 
No doubt, our foundiny fathers has envisioned an 
•Independent Judiciary' and also provided for a number of 
safeguards to ensureit, but, unfortunately, the past 
experience of 45 years of the workiny of our constitution 
shows that all is not well with the Judiciary. The main 
reason for this unfavourable reality is the conflictiny and 
4. See P.B. Menon : INDIAN BAR REVEIW, Vol. X(l), 1983, 
pp. 672-678. 
tense relationship between the Judiciary and Executive onone 
hand and between legislature and Judiciary on the other. In 
the whole process. Judiciary is the institution which has 
suffered more. The result of all this has been the constant 
deterioration of the quality of Justice and Judicial 
standards. Prof, de Smith rightly remarked - "Unless the 
quality and the status of Judiciary is commensurated with 
its responsibilities, the spirit of the constitution will 
eclipse into emptiness".^ 
Thus, it is the ultimate reality of Indian 
democratic system that Judiciary has always been at the 
recieving end here. There have been from time to time, 
numerous instances when our Judiciary has met with serious 
threats to its independence. The formal beginning may be 
said to have taken place in April, 1973 when Justice Ray was 
appointed as CJI, after superseding three senior judges, in 
disregard of age old convention of seniority. And, the 
theory of 'Committed Judiciary' was propounded by the Govt, 
as a Justification for such an unwarrantable action. The 
1973 - Episode was followed by other 'Supersession 
Controversies' and every time, it was the judicial 
independence which was made to stoop as low as to kiss the 
ground of humiliation. 
To a great surprise. Judiciary itself inflicted 
5. Prof. de Smith, Fundamental Rights in the New 
Commonwealth, 10. Int. Comp. L.Q., 236-7 (1981). 
wounds on its own independence when, in Sankalchand & Judges 
case,it acknowledged the Executive's authority as superior 
to that of itself in matters of appointment of judges to 
superior courts and the transfers of HC Judges. 
Fortunately, a bright ray of hope has found its 
way after a long dark night as apex court, in a 
revolutionary decision titled - S.C. Advocates on Record 
Assn V/S Union of India delivered on Oct 6, 1993, ruled on 
the decisive role & primacy of the judiciary inter alia in 
the matter of appointment of judges to the superior Courts 
and the trasfer of High Court Judges. 
In this very case, popularly known as 'Second 
Judges Case', the apex court freed the judiciary from the 
dominance of the executive, rather asserted its independence 
from it by placing the CJ's opinion above all in 
'Appointment & Transfers Matters' and thereby reduced the 
Executive's role to minimum. 
Very recently, in our neighbour Country 
PAKISTAN, the independence of judiciary was asserted when 
on March 20, 1996, the SC, headed by Chief Justice Shajjat 
Ali Shah, said in its verdict that appointment of judges 
have to be made after consultation with the Chief Justice.° 
6. HT : March 24, 1996, p-15; Also see '^ ak judiciary seeks 
Reparation from Executive': by M.B. Naqvi - Art. 
published in 'Times of India', Mar 23, 1996. 
By this judyement, Pak judiciary put constraints 
on the Executive's power reyardiny appointment & transfer of 
judges. This judgement would redeem the higher judiciary in 
Pakistan. 
Pakistan's Constitution is very clear that it is 
the President who appoints the CJ, after consulting with the 
(outgoing) CJ. The CJ, HC is appointed by the President 
after consultation with the CJ & the Governor of the 
provence concerned. 
Before this decision, these constitutional 
provisions were being flouted by the Govt, which used to 
fill the courts with its own men as judges. Inother words, 
the Govt, had assumed the functions of the President in the 
matter of appointment of judges. 
It is submitted that Pakistan S . C, while 
delivering such revolutionary judgement asserting 
independence of judiciary, seems to have proceeded on the 
lines of'Second Judges' Dicision, delivered by Indian apex 
Court. 
The foregoing discussion tends to reveal that 
inspite of the presence of numerous constitutional 
safeguards to ensure an independent judiciary, the Judiciary 
has always been in crisis. In matters of appointment and 
transfer of judges, the Executive has been ejoying unlimited 
T. Ibid 
powers. Althou9h, the 'Second Judyes Case' seems to have 
cometo the rescue of judicial independence and in leyal 
fraternity,it is beiny taken as an appreciable effort 
towards ensuriny an independent judiciary, yet the reality 
is that Judiciary is not totally free from the threats. It 
is still prone to political interferences. 
The present study is beiny made with a view to 
high liyht the conflict of powers between Judiciary and the 
Executive. The main object of the dissertation is to find 
out whether there is really any involvement of Executive 
institution in the judicial arena - particularly in 
matters of 'Appointment of Judges to higher Courts' and 
'Transfer of HC Judges'. And, if there is any such 
involvement, to find out how far it has led to lawlessness 
and arbitrariness. 
Thus, an honest attempt has been made in this 
very direction with the help of judicial decisions. 
The study is based entirely on 'Doctrinal 
Research'. For accomplishing above purpose, the help has 
been taken mainly from Constitutent Assembly Debates; Indian 
Constitution; Commentaries on Indian Constitution by various 
renowned jurists and authorities; and Judicial decisions. 
The whole study is divided in the following 
chapters : 
8 
Chapter - I : Contains brief introduction to the 
dissertation work. 
Chapter - II : Deals with constitutional provisions 
relating to the 'Appointment & Transfer 
of Judges'. 
Chapter - III : In this chapter, an elaborate but 
critical account is yiven regarding 
Independence of Judiciary. The factors 
influencing, the safeguards ensuring an 
independent & impartial judiciary have 
been taken into consideration. 
Chapter - IV : Deals with the policy of appointment of 
judges in three sub-parts. In the first 
part, a criticial analysis of mode of 
selection has been given; in the second 
part, judicial response on the matter 
concerned has been discussed with in 
detail; in the third part, the 
'Appointment of Chief Justice of India 
and principale of Seniority have been 
discussed critically and 'Supersession 
Controversies' have been considered 
elaborately. 
Chapter - V : Deals with the policy of Transfer of H C 
Judges and its need, justification in 
present legal system . It also gives an 
account of judicial decision on the 
matter of transfers. 
Chapter - VI : Comprises of 'Conclusion & Su99estions' 
regarding the matter of 'Appointment & 
transfer of Judges*. 
CHAPTER - II 
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CHAPTER - II 
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK OF APPOINTMENTS & TRANSFER 
OF SC & HC JODGES 
(A) CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES : 
During the early stages of Constitution-making 
the founding fathers faced the challenge to establish 
impartial & independent judiciary. To accomplish this task 
successfully, an ad hoc committee was constituted, which 
consisted of S. Varadacharai, Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, 
B.C. Mitter, K.M. Munshi and B.N. Rau. The committee, which 
based its recommendations mainly on the Govt, of India 
Act-1935, submitted the final report on May 21, 1947. 
Regarding the Appointment of Judges, the 
Committee expressed the view that "appointment of judges 
should not be left to the unfettered discretion of the 
executive" and suggested that the "President should, in 
consultation with the Chief Justice of the SC, nominate a 
person whom he considered fit to be appointed and the 
nomination should be confirmed by at least seven out of a 
panel of eleven persons. The panel was to be composed of 
some of the Chief Justices of High Courts, some members of 
both Houses of Parliament and some law officers of the Union 
Govt. The alternative method suggested was that the panel 
11 
should forward three names out of which the President in 
consultation with the Chief Justice of India may appoint a 
person to the post. The same procedure was to be followed 
for the appointment of the Chief Justice except that there 
would be no consultation with the Chief Justice. Inorder to 
ensure that the panel should function in an impartial and 
non-partisan manner, it was suggested that each panel should 
work for a fixed period of ten years .^  Regarding the 
qualifications of the persons to be considered for 
appointment as judges,the Committee opined that the process 
laid down in the 'Government of India Act-1935' should serve 
as a model for the same. 
These recommendations were discussed in the 
Constituent Assembly on July 29, 1947. The Committee's view 
was fully endorsed by Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar who approved 
the above proposal regarding the procedure for appointment 
of Judges. Mr. K. Santhanam presented an alternative 
proposal for judicial appointment , according to which the 
CJ & other puisne judges of the SC were to be appointed by 
the President "after consulting a joint standing committee 
of both Houses of the Federal Parliament consisting of six 
members from the House of People and five members from the 
Council of States"? But the proposal did not recieve a 
favourable response. 
1. For details see ad-hoc Committee Report. 
2. Constituent Assembly Deabtes. Vol. IV, at 902 p. 
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When draft Article - 103 was beiny framed, 
various suggestions were recieved from different members. 
Some members suggested that consultation process with the CJ 
be made mandatory while with those of High Court Judges be 
considered as directory .3 A further suggestion mooted out 
was that the whole consultative exercise be treated 
informal. 
When the draft Article - 103 came for discussion before the 
Assembly on May 24, 1949, the amendments moved by other 
members, raised the issue of procedure for appointment of 
judges. The suggestions were as follows : 
la) K.C. Sharma suggested that the President should make 
the appointments with the concurrence of C J I. 
{h) Prof. J.T. Shah suggested - "Those appointments should 
be confirmed by the Council of States. 
(c) Prof. S.L. Saxena suggested - "The appointments should 
be approved by two-third members of Parliament. 
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, the Chairman of Drafting 
Committee rejected the proposals and gave the following 
reasons. He observed 
"It seems to me in the circumstances in which we live 
today, where the sense of responsibility has not grown 
to the same extent to which we find in the United 
3. B.Shiva Rao, The Framing of India's Constitution 
Select Document. Vol. Iv, at 142 (1967). 
4. tbld. 
states, it would be dangerous to leave the appointment 
to be made by the president without any kind of 
reservation or limitation, that is to say merely on the 
advice of the executive of the day Apart from 
its combrous, it also involves the possibility of the 
appointment being influenced by political pressure & 
consideration. With regard to the question of 
concurrence of the CJ, it seems to me that those who 
advocate that preposition seem to rely implicitly both 
on the impartiality of the CJ and the soundness of his 
judgement. I personally feel, no doubt, that CJ is a 
very eminent person, but after all, the CJ is a man 
with all his feelings, all the sentiments & all the 
prejudices which we as common people have; and to think 
to allow the CJ practically veto upon the appointments 
of Judges is really to transfer the authority to the 
CJ. Which we are not prepared to vest in the President 
or the Govt, of the day and therefore, think that is 
also a dangerous preposition."^ 
In Ambedkar's view, the proposal in the Draft 
Constitution that there should be a consultation with person 
exhypothesi well qualify to give proper advice, should be 
regarded as sufficient. Thus a middle course was steered. The 
consultation process with the C J I was designed as a 
Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. VIII at 258 
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compromise check on the Executive's discretion in this 
matter. 
When the principles of the Constitution were 
being discussed, there was a general agreement that like the 
Supreme Court Judges, the appointment of High Court Judges 
should also not be left to the unguided discretion of the 
Executive. There was a proposal that judges of the High 
Courts should be appointed by the Governor with the approval 
of the two third of the members of the Council of States? 
But the idea to set up the Council had been abandoned in the 
meantime. There was a specific proposal from the Provincial 
Constitution Committee that the judges of the High Courts 
should be appointed by the President of the Federation in 
consultation with the Chief Justice of Supreme Court, the 
Governor of the Province & the Chief Justice of the 
concerned High Court except where the Chief Justice was 
himself to be a candidate for appointment. 
Explaining the proposals in the Assembly 
Vallabhbai Patel : "These proposals were designed to 
secure fair selection & appointments to the High Courts so 
that party politics do not enter the judicial coridoors."^ 
6. B.Shiva Rao, at 640. 
7. C.A.D., Vol IV, at 710. 
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In the Assembly, some of the members wanted to 
do away with the consultative process with the Governor. 
Infact, prof. S.L. Saxena suggested that a body of judges of 
the SC and High Court should be constituted on these 
appointments. 
In the end, however, the proposals of the 
Drafting Committee were adopted by the Assembly. Later, the 
Drafting Committee added one more Article (Presently 
Article-222) to enable the President to transfer judges from 
one High Court to another? 
(B) CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO APPOINTMENT & 
TRANSFER OF JUDGES : 
(i) Provisions relating to the appointment of SC Judges : 
ARTICLE - 124 : 
Clause (1) - "There shall be a Supreme Court of India 
consisting of a Chief Justice of India and, 
until Parliament by law prescribes a larger 
number, of not more than seven other 
judges". 
Clause (2) - Every judge of the Supreme Court shall be 
appointed by the President by warrant under 
his hand and seal after consultation with 
such of the judges of the SC & of High Courts 
in the States as the President may deem 
8. Granville, Austin, Indian Constitution : Cornerstone of 
a Nation, 164-84 (lSf66) 
9. Now "twenty five" Vide Act 22 of 1986 
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necessary for the purpose and shall hold 
office until he attains the age of Sixty-Five 
years: 
Provided that in the case of appointment 
of a judge other than the Chief Justice, the 
Chief Justice of India shall always be 
consulted : 
Provided further that : 
(a) a judge may, by writing under his hand 
addressed to the President, resign his 
office; 
(b) a judge may be removed from his office in 
the manner provided in Clause (4). 
Clause (3) - A person shall not be qualified for 
appointment as a judge of the Supreme Court 
unless he is a citizen of India> and 
(a) has been for atleast five years a judge of 
a High Court or of two or more such Courts 
in succession; or 
(b) has been for at least ten years an advocate 
of a High Court or of two or more such 
court in succession, or • 
(c) is, in the opinion of the President a 
distinguished Jurist. 
lii) Provisions relating to the appointment & transfer of 
High Court Judges : 
17 
ARTICLE - 216 
"Every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such 
other judges as the President may from time to time deem it 
necessary to appoint". 
ARTICLE - 217 
Clause (1) - "Every Judge of a High Court shall be 
appointed by the President by warrant under 
his hand and seal after consultation with the 
Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the 
State, and, in the case of appointment of a 
Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief 
Justice of the High Court,' and (shall 
hold office, in the case an additional or 
acting Judge, as provided in Article-224, & 
in any other case, until he attains the age 
of •'-•'• (sixty-two years) : 
Provided that : 
(a) a judge may, by writing under his hand 
addressed to the President resign his 
office; 
(b) a judge may be removed from his office by 
the President in the manner provided in 
Clause (4) of Article- 124 for the removal 
of a Judge of the Supreme Court, 
10. Substituted by Section-12, of Constitutional (Seventh) 
Amendment Act, 1956, for "shall hold office until he 
attains the age of 60 years". 
11. Substituted by the Consitution (Fifteenth Amendment) 
Act, 1963, Sec. 4, for "Sixty Years". 
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(c) the office of a Judge shall be vacated by 
his being appointed by the President to 
be a Judge of the Supreme Court or by his 
being transferred by the President to any 
other High Court within the territory of 
India". 
Clause (2) - "A person shall not be qualified for 
appointment as a judge of a High Court unless 
he is a citizen of India, and -
(a) has for at least ten years held a 
judicial office in the territory of 
India; or 
(b) has for at least ten years been an 
advocate of a High Court. 
ARTICLE - 222 
Clause (1) - "The President may, after consultation with 
the Chief Justice of India, transfer a Judge 
from one High Court to any other High Court.^^ 
•'••^iilause (2)- "When a Judge has been or is so transferred, 
he shall, during the period he serves, after 
the commencement of the Constitution 
(Fifteenth Amendment) Act 1963, as a Judge of 
12. The words "within the territory of India" Omitted by 
the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act 1956, S.14. 
13. Inserted by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act 
1963, S.5 Original Clause (2) was Omitted by the 
Const. (Seventh Amend) Act, 1956, S.14. 
19 
the other Hiyh Court, be e n t i t l e d to rec ieve 
inaddi t ion to his salary such compensatory 
allowance as may be determined by Parl iament 
by law and, u n t i l so determined such 
compensatory allowance as the Pres iden t may be 
order f i x ] " . 
********** 
CHAPTER - HI 
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CHAPTER - III 
INDEPENDENCE OF JUDICIARY 
"The independence of judiciary is the livewire of 
our judicial system and if that wire is snapped, the 'dooms 
day' of judiciary will not be far off". 
-S.R. Pandian. 
Justice Pandian very aptly described the tremendous 
significance and precious value of 'Independence of 
Judiciary, Infact, our Judicial system owes its very 
existence to such independence and the destruction of 
so-called wire will, certainly, lead to the collapse of the 
whole judicial system. 
N.A. Palkhiwala, noted constitutional expert also 
realizes this reality when writes : 
"Independence of Judiciary is the very heart of a 
Republic."^ 
Our apex court once made the following observation 
in the course of historic opinion given by it to the 
president of India. 
1. S.C. Advocates on record Assn. V/S Union of India (1994) 
S.C.J. Vol.1, p. 353 
2. Palkhiwala N.- The SC Judgement in Judges case J.B.C.I. 
(1982). "^  
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"The existence of a fearless & independent Judiciary 
can be said to be the very basic foundation of the 
constitutional structure in India." 
3 
C.J. Beg commented that fearless independence rests 
on two pillars : 
First, the power of courts to protect the citizen against 
every species of wrong or injustice whether from another 
citizen, however. Powerful, or from the sta.te itself; and 
secondly, upon the understanding, the -wisdom and the 
restraint of those who preside over the courts so that 
these powers are not abused and remain free from corruption 
of any kind. 
He further mentioned a book on the subject by Mr. 
Robert Payne entitled. "The Corrupt Society" in which it 
was said that it us only those who can exercise power free 
from partiality, or prejudice or anger or muddle headffedness 
or improper motivation, who can act really independently so 
asto be entitled to respect and confidence of the public. 
3. An excerpvt from the speech of Mr. J. Beg, at the 
inauguration of Diamond Jubliee celebrations of Patna 
High Court on the 'Role of Judges'. (11 Dec. 1977) 
Patna. 
22-
In Indian perspective, the tradition of 
independence of judiciary may be traced back a long time 
before the independence of India herself, so there would be 
no exaggeration in saying that this very tradition has, 
after its total assimilation, become the indispensable part 
of Indian legal system because the seeds of such tradition 
4 
were sown even before the birth of our Republic. 
Historically speaking, althouth, in India Judges 
held their office at the pleasure of the kind (Section 102 
(1), Govt, of India Act, 1915) till the Govt, of India Act, 
1935, in practice, no, attempt was made by the Executive to 
interfere with the independence of Judiciary. A 
distinguished line of English & Indian High Court Judges 
had established a tradition of independent, & fearless 
administration of justice in British India which the 
framers of our constitution were anxious to maintain & 
stregthen. This anxiety led them to include provision for 
separation of. Executive from Judiciary under the Article, 
50 which reads as follows : 
4. C.A.D. Vol, VIII-1948, pp-582-6, 964-5, 588-90, 965-7. 
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"The state shall take steps to separate, the 
J 
Judiciary from the executive in the public services of the 
state." 
Thus, the tradition of 'Separation of Judiciary 
from Executive' has been incorporated as one of the Directive 
principles of our constitution. Though,these Directives are not 
enforceable by the courts, yet these principles have been 
declared to be fundamental in the governance of the country 
by Article-37 and series of decisions show that Fundamental 
Rights & Directive Principles are meant to supplement one 
another. If, Directive Principles prescibe goals to be 
attained, the Fundamental Rights lay down the means to 
achieve such goals. Such is the significance of Directives 
that in Fundamental Rights case , they have been declared 
as "Conscience of our constitution", which emobody the 
social philosophy of the constitution and its basic values; 
All this plainly reveals, without any scope for, doubt or 
debate, the intent of the constitution makers to immunise 
the judiciary from any form of Executive control or 
interference. 
5. Keshavanand Bharti 115 State of Kerela AIR-1978 SC, 1461 
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Thus, the tradition built up was that of Non, 
political Judiciary and the main credit, for such 
development goes to C.J. Sir M. Guryer when he said in 
Keshav Talpade case that in the Federal Court of India -
"amidst the clash of arms, the laws are not silent". 
This was assisted by First Chief Justice of 
Independent India Sir Heralal Kania in the following words; 
"The SC, an all India court, will stand firm. & 
aloof from party. Politics & political theories "^ 
Thus, independence of Judiciary has become a matter 
of vital concern for everyone whether it be Judges or 
lawyers or common people i.e. the loltimate sovereign and 
they realize this harsh fact that a slight deviation from 
the standards of such independence may lead to the casualty 
of Rule of law, resulting in confusion & disorder. 
6. (1943) FCR, p. 49. 
7. 1950, S.C.R., Page-13, from in CJ's reply to the 
welcoming address of the AttorneyGeneral. 
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The concept of an independent Judiciary now' . 
Forms part of the basic structure of the constitution & 
the same is unalterable. Justice Bhagwati in famous 
g 
Judges case came out with the outlines of 'Judicial 
Independence thus :-
"The concept of 'Independence of Judiciary* is a 
basic feature of the constitution, if there is one 
Principle which runs through the entire fabric of the 
constitution, it is the principle of rule of law, and 
under the constitution it is the judiciary which is 
entrusted with the task of keeping every organ of the 
State within the limits of the law and thereby marking 
the rule of law meaningful and effective. 'Judges 
should be on stern stuff & tough tibre, unbending 
before power, economic or political and they must 
uphold the core principle of the rule of law which says 
8. S.P. Gupta v/s President of India AIR, 1982, SC 
page - 149. 
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"Be you ever so high, the law is above you". This is 
the principle of independence of the judiciary which is 
vital for the establishment of real participatory 
democracy, maintainence of the rule of law as a dynamic 
concept and delivery of 'Social Justice' to vulnerable 
section of the community". 
Thus, an independent judiciary is essential as 
well as indispensable to every democratic state because 
the common people look up to it as an ultimte refuge 
for vindication of their right and liberties. The 
constitution of India ensure this independence in 
several ways :-
FIRSTLY I- Under the doctrine of'Ultra Vires' which is 
part of our law, the SC and the High Courts are under 
duty to declare a law void if it violates any 
9 
provisions of our constitution. This power of 
9. Art 13 
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'Judicial Review* is strengthened by the power 
conferred upon the Supreme Court to issue writs for the 
enforcement of Fundamental Rights and on the High 
Courts the further power to issue such writs for 'any 
other purpose' 
SECONDLY ;- The judges of the Supreme Court and High 
Courts have been made independent of the executive and 
the legislature. They hold office during good behaviour 
and they can be removed only when an address is 
presented to the President by both the houses of 
Parliament. They are insulated against any criterion 
even from the floor of legislature except- when a 
motion in Parliament to remove them. The age of 
retirement of SC & HC judges, is fixed by the 
12 constitution . The salaries & allowances are fixed by 
the constitution and are charged on the 
10. Arts 32 & 226 
11. Art, 24 (4) 
12. Art 124 (2) 
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consolidated fund, so that they can not be subjected to the 
vote of legislature. Similarly, the conditions of service 
asto leave, pension etc. have been secured against any 
14 
variation to their disadvantage rfter their appointment 
H.M. Seervai points out other ways by which 
independence of judiciary is ensured by our constitution 
framers. No discussion can take place in parliament or the 
state legislatures about the conduct of a judge in the 
discharge of his judicial duties. The SC and the High Court^ 
have power to punish for contempt, a power designed to 
protect the administration of justice from interference 
from any quarter 
Under the general law, a Judge enjoys absolute 
immunity for anything said or done in the discharge of his 
duties. In the appointment of a Judge of SC (other than 
CJI) the President must consult the CJI and in the 
appointment of Judges of a HC (other than CJ), the 
13. Arts 125 (1), 221 (1) 
14. Arts 125 (2), 221 (2) 
15. See H.M. Seervai : Emergency, future safeguards and the 
HabeBS corpus case : 
A Criticism, p. (1978) 
16. Articles - 129 ft 215 
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President must consult the CJI and the Chief Justice & 
the Governor of the state concerned . These PrDvisions, it 
was believed, would ensure an independent Judiciary, free 
from the Executive or legislative pressure. 
But have these provisions really been successful in 
getting the required job done i.e. have they succeeded in 
ensuring that independence which was, infact, intended by 
the framers & our constitution ? 
It is true that the founding fathers has envisioned 
an independent judiciary and also made a number of 
safeguards to ensure it but unfortunately, the past experience 
tends to show that all is not well with the Judiciary. 
There have been from time to time numerous instances when 
our Judiciary has met with serious & lethal threats to its 
independence from outside as well as from within. 
The Indian history is full of instances when threats 
have been posed to the Judiciary by undue political oir 
Executive interferences. 
17. Articles - 124 (2), 217 (1). 
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The beginning point may be traced back to the 
•Supersession controversy' in April, 1973 when the three SC 
Judges Mr. J. Shelat, Mr. J. Hegde & Mr. J. Grover were 
superseded in disregard of age-old convention of seniority 
and Mr. J. A.N. Ray was installed as CJI. This supersession 
was the immediate retaliation to the 'Basic structure 
Device', evolved in Fundamental Rights case. All the three 
Judges resigned in protest. The Govt. Justified its 
unprecedented move by propounding the theory of 'Committed 
Judiciary', through Mr. Kumarmanglarh then the minister of 
steel. It was stated that Independent India needed judges 
who should be committed not only to the social philosphy 
of the constitution but also to that of the Govt. J. Ray's 
philosophy for his judgements in Bank Nationalization & 
privy purses cases was found to be more progressive. 
It is to be submitted here that whatever may be the 
reasons given, the whole show was an instance of clear cut 
dominance of Executive over Judiciary. 
Further, another supersession arose in January, 1977 
when Mr. J. Beg was appointed as CJI and senior most judge 
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Mr. J. Kharina who had also given a forceful dissent in 
A.D.M. Jabalpur case known as Emergency Preventive 
DEtention Case where the judges in majority, 
unhesitatingly, endorsed the decision of Supreme Executive 
to deprive the Indian citizens of their precious freedc*ia. 
Mr. J. Khanna,inspite of being senior most sitting SC judge 
was not even considered for the appointment. To protect his 
dignity he resigned. This time, the Govt, did not talk 
about the "Social philosphy of the Judges". 
It was explained that the senior - most Judge would 
have served a very short term.. as Chief Justice. The 
argument seemed to be totally, unconvincing because there 
had hitherto been short term of Chief Justices. 
Again, another threat to the Judiciary was presented 
& this time it was not in the form of Supersession of 
Senior Judge' but in the form of 'Demotion of a H,C Judge to 
Sessions Court. 
During darkest period of Emergency declared on June 
26, 1975, a Judge of the Delhi High Court was then a 
temporary one. He was not confirmed as a permanent Judge of 
the High Court but was reverted back to the position of 
District & Sessions Judge, Delhi merely because he happened 
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to disagree on the grounds of detention of Eminent 
Journalist Kuldip Nayar, son-in-law of Bhimsen sachar, Ex. 
Chief Minister of Punjab. Not only that, the Judge, was 
also harassed by repeatedly asking him to vacate his 
residence at Tilak Marg & shift.to Sessions Bunglow which 
was not vacated. The Central Estate Office, even went to 
the extent of pasting notices on the door of his residence 
for urgent vacation. A move was also made to ease him out 
from the Judiciary & appoint him as Secretary, Law 
Department of Delhi Administration. 
It is really lamenting that dignity of Judiciary ; 
has received such serious blows from time to time. 
The aforesaid decisions of the Govt, raise a genuine 
suspicion into the mind of the people asto the 
efficiency of the constitutional safeguards in ensuring a 
real 'Independent Judiciary'. 
Seervai finds it necessary to state that 
independence of a Judge can be threatened not only by the 
Executive or by Political Interference but also by 
'Financial Anxiety' Seervai expresses his worries over the 
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fact that Pandit Nehru hope that first rate talent in the 
Country must be attracted to the SC & High Courts, has 
become incapable of fulfillment because their salaries 
were not reasonable. As a result, leading members of Bar'. 
Some of whom would make very able judges are not interest 
in a Judgeship carrying a salary of Rs. 3,500 or Rs. 
4,000, now such worries should be kept off the mind since 
the salaries of SC & HC Judges have been revised by the 
44th Amendment ct., 1986. Now, revised salaries are : Rs. 
10,000, 9,000, 9,000, 8,000. for Chief Justice of India, 
any other Judge of SC, Chief Justice of HC, any other 
Judge of HC respectively. 
There have also been threats of Judicial Independence 
from within. The decisions of our apex court in 
18 Sakalchand, & Judges cases show how the Judiciary 
inflicted wounds on its independence by virtually 
acknowledging the superior authority of the Executive to 
appoint or not to appoint. Judges. 
18. (a) Union of India v/s Sakalchand AIR-1971, Sc. 2328. 
(b) S.P. Gupta v/s/ President of India. AIR-1982 
Sc, 149. 
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This meant that the greatest violator of all 
laws and the single, largest litigant before all courts 
i.e. Executive can select its own Judges. 
No doubt, a bright ray of hope has found its way 
after a long dark night when apex court in a recent 
19 
case , has established with full courage & determination, 
the 'Primacy of Chief Justice' opinion above all in 
appointments of SC & HC Judges and the role of the 
Executive, in the process has been reduced to minimum. 
The independence of Judiciary was also threatened, 
during the period of Emergency, by the compulsory transfers 
of Judges whose judgements were unwelcome to Govt, to other 
High Courts. This was an attempt to coerce Judges into 
giving judgements which the Govt, wanted them to give. A 
compulsory transfer involves grave hardships personal. 
Domestic & Financial to which few Judges would willingly 
submit. Thus, in May, 1976, Sixteen Judges of various HCs 
were transferred & there existed a list of another 'Forty 
19. S.C, Advocates on Record Association v/s Union of India 
AIR-1994. S.C. 
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Judges' who were to be transferred Infact, the provision 
under Article 222 relating to transfer of HC Judges was 
used & abused from time to time & it has been used as a 
wsapon against all those Judges, who have shown 
Courage . convictions & fearlessness in delivering their 
decisions & refused to toe the line of the Govt. 
20 The Judicial decisions m Sakalchand & Judges 
21 case made the situation worse as the consent of theJudge 
being transferred was altogether ruled out as requirement. 
It was made clear that a Judge can be transferred in Public 
Interest' without his consent. 
The chances of abuse of this provision under 
Article-222 have been reduced to some extent by the r 
22 decision in 'Second Judges' case where it was firmly 
established that although consent of the transferxed Judge 
or CJ is not required for transfer from one High Court to 
an other, but the opinion of CJI has not mere primacy but 
is determinative in the matters of such transfers. It is 
20. Union of India v/s Sakalchand-AIR, 1971, SC. 2328 
21. S.P. Gupta v/s President of India, AIR-1982,SC,149. 
22. S.C. Advocates on Record Association v/s Union of India 
AIR-1994, S.C. — --.--
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submitted that the opinion of the C.J. is determinative and 
primary over all other creative authorities. 
Another threat posed to Judicial independence, during 
the same period i.e. of Emergency, was more subtle and had 
it been carried out the result would have been most damaging 
to Judicial Independence. It was given out that two 
alternative amendments to the constitution were under the 
consideration of Govt. The first was to set a body superior 
to the SC, and the other was to remove, or greatly, curtail 
the powers of Judicial Review of the SC, and of the High 
Courts. These threatned amendments raise a vexed question of 
the scope and amit of the amending power Seervai) suggests 
that if the independence of SC is to be maintained one way 
is to make constitution, powers and organisation of the SC, 
a basic feature of the constitution. 
Further more, it must necessarily be proved that 
amendment of the Constitution affecting the constitution, 
organisation & powers of the SC shall not be moved until 
after it has been formulated in the form of a 
23. H.M. Seervai : Emergency, Future Safeguards & Habeas 
corpus case - 1978. 
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bill and gazetted and freelymade available to public. 
In order to sum up the whole discussion, it may be 
said that our founding fathers were keen to preserve an 
independent Judiciary and they made elaborate constitutional 
provisions for ensuring such independence. The for going 
discussion, however, reveals that the various safeguards 
enshrined in the constitution have become illusory with the 
passage of time. In matters of appointment,promotion &. 
transfer of Judges, the Executive enjoys almost unlimited 
powers. Although, the decision in. Second Judges' case' has 
provided a great sigh of relief as it has curtailed the 
Executive's powers in such matters, yet Judiciary is not 
totally free from threats and it would be an ostrich, like 
approach to think that after the Second Judges decision. 
Judiciary is totally safe & secured as there still exists 
scope fot the abuse of constitutional provisions to the 
detriment of independence of judiciary. 
So, it would be beneficial to consider certain 
suggestions by noted writer H.M. Seervai here which, if 
adopted, may provide miraculous results in ensuring 
Judicial independence. 
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He states two simple rules as necessary. 
.First ,_ no judge should make any pronouncement 
on any matter-social, political or economic or legal 
which is likely to come before him as a Judge. This 
rule does not prevent a Judge from stating the law 
as it exists. 
Second, the constitution provides for the. separation of 
Judiciary from the Executive . under Article-50. Such 
separation ought not be a mere matter of form but of 
substance . e.jg. No Judge should have frequent social 
contacts with ministers & members of the Executive. 
In our opinion -he also opines & rightly he does so 
that there two rules should be incorporated in the 
conditions of service of every Judge, if necessary, by a 
suitable constitutional Amendment and the contravention of 
those rules should be made a 'misbehaviour' within the 
meaning of Article-124 (4). 
In words of Seervai. 
"If the constitution is to guarantee the 
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independence of Judiciary, Judges owe it to the 
public to earn the independence which the Constitution 
..24 guarantees. 
and, at last, what we can domore is : TO HOPE FOR 
THE BEST IN FUTURE. 
23. H.M. Seevai : Emergency, Future safeguard & Habeas 
Corpus case 1978 Pac,e 127. 
CHAPTER - IV 
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CHAPTER - IV 
THE POLICY OF APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES 
In order to ensure an Independent Judiciary in a 
given democratic society, it is necessary that the 
Judicial institutions are manned by wise & brilliant men 
of high integrity. The quality of Judges, in any system, 
depends, ' to a great extent, on the method of their 
selection and appointment and the standards applied by the 
appointing authorities in the process of such selection. 
Infact, the criteria of selection of Judges has a direct 
bearing on their integrity and independence. Such 
requirements impose an obligation of exercising care & 
caution of high standards on the authorities playing 
decisive role in the selection of Judges. 
The debate on the matter embraces some vexed 
questions for consideration. 
(i) Is there any prescribed procedure for the selection 
& appointment of Judges under our constitution ? 
(ii) It so, what actually is the criteria for such 
selection ? 
(iii) Who are the various authorities involved in the 
process of selection ? 
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(iv) Have the concerned provisions been followed 
satisfactorily ? 
(v) What has in fact, been the attitude of Judiciary 
towards the matter concerned ? 
For the sake of convenience, the whole matter, 
involving above queries, need to be discussed in the 
following parts ; 
Part A- Modes of Selection of Judges : A Critical 
analysis. 
Part B- Judicial ^ titude 
Part C- Appointment of Chief Justice and the 
conventional principle of seniority. 
42 
PART - (A) Modes of Selection of Judges ; A Critical 
analysis. 
Endless discussions have taken place regrding the 
various modes of selection of Judges at world at large and 
India is no exception. 
G.R. Rajagopaul examines critically the various 
possiblemodes for such selection in other democracies. He 
writes that although, there are various possible methods 
in practice in various democratic countries for such 
selection but at last one may sort out only two methods, 
viz. 
(i) The process of Election, either by the people at 
large or by the Elected representatives of the 
people ; 
(ii) By the process of appointment by the Executive with 
some safeguards. 
1) G.R. Rajagopaul : Appointment & Transfer of Judges of 
Higher Courts- Art Published in JBCI,Vol-9 (1982) 
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The proceeds to assert that the 'Election Method' 
has generally, been agreed to as the worst form of 
selection except in thoseminor cases where the people's 
association, with the administration of Justice is likely 
to yield better results. Even where 'Election' system 
prevails, necessary safeguards have to be thoughts, of for 
securing the independence of the judiciary which is always 
a basic feature e.f in Switzerland - where the federal 
judges are elected by the federal Assembly & where they 
have to be elected in such a way asto represent all the 
three linguistic areas of the st^te, independence is 
sought to be secured by re electing the Judges from time 
to time, more or less for life. 
In U.S.A., choice by the legislature which was in 
practice for sometime has now been given up. Now, the 
Judges are appointed by the president, subject to a veto 
by the senate. 
But, Rajagopaul critically lays down that such 
method as adopted by the U.S.A. or method of 'Periodical 
Review' by the House of Representatives as adopted in 
Japan -
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2 
"is likely to make thematter worse" . 
In U.K., the High Court Judges are appointed by the 
crown, on the advice of the Lord Chancellor who is a 
manber of the cabinet, while appointments to the Court of 
Appeal and the House of Lords & to the offices of Lord 
Chief Justice, Master of Rolls and President of Family 
division are made by the crown on the advice of the Prime 
Minister after consultation with the Lord Chancellor. 
The method adopted by England has been Justified by 
J. Bhaqwati in Judges case in the following words. "The 
appointments of Judges belonging to the higher echelous of 
Judicial service are wholly in thehands of Executive ; 
but it has produced very satisfactory results because of 
the Pre-eminence of the Lord Chancellor, his close 
association with the bar and his membership of one of the 
inns and the fear that he would lose the respect of the 
profession if he made any wrong nominations or 
appointments aid for wrong motives." 
2. Ibid, pp. 277 
3. Ibid, quoted on pp. 275. 
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But, so far as India is concerned say Rajagopaul, 
scene is entirely different here. He finds it unwise & 
improper to rule out at the very outset the association of 
the Executive in the, Judge selection process because in 
his view, Stte is in the best position to know about, the 
character, anticedents, affiliations, integrity etc. of 
any proposed candidate. Dissociation of the Executive may 
three organs of the Govt, must necessarily work in close 
Co-operation in furthering the objectives of the 
constitution. 
But, how far the holding by Rajagoplaul holds 
ground can only be seen after proper literal examination of 
constitutional provision relating to the selection 
process. 
Under Indian constitution, the power of appointment 
of Judges of SC is provided under : 
Article - 124 (2) - "Every Judge of the SC shall be 
appointed by the President by warrant under hishand & 
seal, after consultation with such of the Judges of the SC 
and of the High Courts in the States as the President may 
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deem necessary for the purpose. 
Provided that in the case of appointment of a Judge 
other than the CJI, the CJI shall always be consulted". 
The procedure for appointment of SC is set out in 
this very Article, one look at the actual wording of this 
Article, it becomes quite clear that in sub clause (2), 
the consultation process is purely discretionary for the 
words used are "may deem it necessary" whereas the 
consultation provided in the proviso is obligatory in 
nature for the words are "shall always be consulted". In 
other words, in the appointment of a Judge other than CJ, 
the President is bound to obtain the opinion of CJI. 
Thus, the above provision recognises the 
Pre-eminent position of CJI by making consultationwith him 
mandatory for the above purpose. Whatever meaning may 
assign to the word "Consultation", the fact remains 
undisputed that consultation does not mean approval. But, 
having taken into account overall position and also the 
fact CJI is the head of the highest Judicial institution 
of the country, his advice is, normally, to carry weight & 
might be decisive. 
47 
The power, and process of appointment of Judges of 
High Courts have been laid down under Article, 217 (i). 
Article. 217 (i) Provides : 
"Every Judge of a High Court shall be appointed 
by the President by a warrant under his hand & seal after 
consultation with the CJI, the Governor of the State, and 
in case of appointment, of Judge other than Chief Justice 
the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned ". 
The language of the above provision shows that 
there are four constitutional functionaries who play a 
vital role in the selection process. These are CJ of the 
HC concerned, the Governor of the concerned state, the 
CJI, and the President of India. This criteria is designed 
to test the fitness of the person considered for the High 
Court Judgeship, his character, integrity and his 
competence in various branches of the law and the life. 
The risk against an unfit person being appointed a High 
Court Judge is minimised by making consultation with the 
CJ of High Court and the SC, a mandatory requirement of 
the appointing process. This appears to be the reason that 
these two Chief Justices have been made a part of the 
selection procedure. 
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It is submitted here that the CJ of High Court is 
the most suitable person who can make a rational 
and satisfactory appraisal of the capacity and characters 
of the members of Bar as a person fit to be appointed as 
Judge. 
4 
H.M. Seervai clarifies the whole position that". 
Chief Justice of the High Court concerned has the first, 
hand knowledge asto the conduct of eligible candidates 
inside the Court but regarding their conduct out side the 
four walls ofthe Court, it may not be known to CJ and may 
be known to State Govt, through its various investigative 
agencies. This seems to be the reason asto why the State 
Govt. (Governor) has been made part of the selection 
process. The role of the CJI is to scrutinize from his 
position as the head of the highest judicial institution 
of the country, the recommendation of the CJ of High Court 
and to see that local sectarian or regional considerations 
have not influenced the choice of the person recommended". 
4. H.M. Seervai : Constitutional Law of India, Vol-II at 
2434 (1984). 
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He further points out that although Art- 217(i) 
provides for consultation between the four functionaries, 
it does not explain the nature of such consultation, the 
exact procedure to be adopted in appointing Judges and the 
relation of these functionaries with each other vis-a-vis 
the weight accorded to the role played by each other of 
them in selection process. 
While considering this method of selection where 
the entire power is vested in the Executive and also 
replying the question as to satisfactory working of the 
above provisions, the Law Commission in its Fourteenth 
Report made the following observations. 
It is vfiidely felt that communal and regional 
considerations have prevailed in making the selection of 
the Judges. The idea seems to have gained ground that the 
component States of India should have, as it were, 
representation on the Court What perhaps is still 
more to be regretted is the general impression that now & 
again executive influence exlerted from the highest 
quarters has been responsible for some appointments to the 
Bench. It is undoubtedly true that the best talent among 
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the Judges of the High Court has not always found its way 
to the SC."^ 
The dissatisfaction of the Govt, with the present 
method became again expressed when Law Commission in its, 
80th Report (1979) made the recommendations that the CJI, 
while recommending the name of any person for the 
appointment as a Judge of the SC, should consult his three 
senior most. Colleagues and should, in the communication 
incorporating his recommendation, specify the result of 
sucji consultation and reproduce the views of each of his 
colleagues Ihe role of the senior Judges should be 
confined to commenting on the recommendation of the Chief 
Justice. 
As regards the High Courts, Law Commission in its 
14th Report criticised very strongly the unsatisfactory 
nature of selection of Judges on the ground that they are 
not always made on ment. The Commission recommended that 
Article-217(i) should be amended to provide that "a Judge 
of a High Court should be appointed on recommendation of 
5. LAW COMMISSION- XIV Report (1958, at 1-40) 
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the CJ of the High Court with the concurrence of the 
CJI"^ 
But, the Govt, did not accept this recommendation, 
on the other hand, it stated: "As a matter of course. High 
Court Judges have been appointed with the concurrence of 
the CJI"^. 
The observations made by the Law Commission clearly 
suggests that there is something wrong with the existing 
procedure adopted for appointment of HC & SC Judges. 
H.M. Seervai does not share this view that 
Executive should have no say in the appointment of Judges. 
In his view the provisions themselves are unimpeachable 
because they entrust the appointment of Judges of SC to 
the President assisted by CJI and such other Judges of the 
SC and HCS as the President may desire to consult; and the 
appointment of Judges of HCS to the President, in 
consultation with Governor of the State, the CJ of the 
State and CJI. It is not possible to suggest different 
6. Ibid pp. 71-75 
7. Rajya Sabha Debates, Nov. 24, 1959. 
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provision for securing more satisfactory appointments 
because the most admirable provisions must fail as long as 
it is possible for the appointing authorities. Judicial or 
Executive or both to say : "X is incomparably the best 
man, but we will appoint Y." 
The gist of Seervai's holding seems to be that the 
security for the appointment of good Judges, lis not in 
the nature of the appointing authority but in the sense of 
duty to those charged with making the appointments and in 
a vigilant public and professional opinion. 
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PART -(B) JUDICIAL ATTITUDE 
The objective exmination of the constitutional 
provisions regrding appointment of Judges as well as the 
observations of the Law Commission and of various well 
known jurists leave a suspicion in the reader's mind asto 
theefficient working of the Provision in real life. To 
clear such doubts, it becomes necessary to highlight the 
Judicial craftmanship in this regard. 
The leading case on the matter is S.P. Gupta v/s 
Q 
President of India , an apex court decision. Popularly 
known as Judges case. 
In this case, SC got an opportunity to examine the 
constitutional provisions relating to the appointment of 
Judges. The SC considered the following questions : 
(i) Whether the power of the Executive to appoint 
Judges is purely an executive function? 
(ii) What is the actual role of each constitutional 
functionary mentioned in Article-217 of the 
constitution? 
8. AIR - 1982, SC, pp-149. 
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(iii) What is meant by 'Consultation' ? 
(iv) Whether Primacy can be given to the advice of CJI in 
the matter of selection of Judges ^nd can he veto an 
appointment ? 
The Court was unanimous in holding thatpower to 
appoint Judges is purely an executive function. It was 
acknowledged that though the power to appoint Judges 
vested in the President, it was not an unfettered exercise 
of power in the sense that Central Govt. can act 
arbitrarily without consulting the constitutional 
functionaries specified in two. Articlesbut it can act only 
after consulting them and consultation must be full & 
effective consultation. 
Explaining the reasons for vesting the power in the 
President, Justice Bhagwati observed that the reason why 
the power of appointment of Judges is left to the 
Executive appears to be that Executive is responsible to 
the legislature. The power of appointment of Judges is not 
entrusted to the CJI or to CJ, HC because they donot have 
any accountability. 
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The above observation by J. Bhagwati gives rise to 
a significant question regarding the meaning of the term 
'Consultation'. 
Fortunately, this question stands concluded by the 
9 
decision of SC in Sankalchand Sh6th case . 
Considering the term 'Consultation' used in the 
Article 222, Justice Chandrachud in the Sankalchand case, 
quoted the following lines from the Judgement given by J. 
Subba Rao in : 
R. Pushpam v/s State of Madras . as follows :-
"The word "Consult" implies a conference of two or 
more persons or an impact of two or more minds in respect 
of topic in order to enable them to evolve a correct or at 
least a satisfactory solution" 
He furtheradded : 
9. Union of India v/s Sankalchand. AIR-1971, SC pp.2328. 
10. AIR-1953, Madras, 392. 
11. Supra note - 8 pp. 200 Also See Sankalchand Case. 
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"In order that two minds may be able to confer & 
produce a mutual impact, it is essential that each, must 
have, for its consideration full & identical facts which 
can at once, constitute both the source & foundation of 
12 the final decision." 
In Sankalchand case. Justice Krishna Iyer also 
pointed out that the materials in the possession of one 
who consults, must be unreservedly placed before the 
consultee. 
y 
Therefore, it follows that nothing was to be kep^t 
secret from the consulting parties which related to Judges 
'Appointment. These observationsapply with equal force to 
determine the scope & meaning of consultation within the 
meaning of two Articles under consideration. 
Justice Bhagwati also explained the meaning of the 
term consultation. According to him, the 'Consultation' 
contemplated in above provisions means full & effective 
consultation, where all full & identical facts affecting 
12. Ibid. 
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the appointment are brought to the notice of all 
constitutional authorities and after, obtaining their 
opinion, a final decision is reached by the govt, of 
India, regarding the approval or disapproval of the 
concerned Judge for judgeship. 
The next queries arising for considertion are : What 
actually is the value which may be attached to the advice 
rendered by the CJI to the President? Whether the 
President is bound to accept such advice? Does the CJI 
have final say in the appointment of Judge? Can he veto an 
appointment? 
14 In Judges case/ the Court by majority took the 
view that President is not bound by such advice. This 
meant that the advice of CJ had no primacy. The learned 
Judges proceed to state that while giving the fullest 
meaning & effect to 'Consultation', it must be borne in 
mind that it is only consultation which is provided by way 
of fetter upon the power of appointment /^ested in the 
central Govt. & consultation can not be equated with 
concurrence. They futher laid down : 
14. Majority Judgement was delivered by Justice 
BhagwatijJ. Fazal Ali, J. Desai, J. Venkatramiah. 
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"We agree with what Krishna i yer J. said in 
Sankalchand case that 'Consultation is different from 
•Consentaneity". They may discuss by may disagree; they 
may discuss by may disagree ; they may confer but may not 
..15 concur." 
Explaning the reasons for not giving primacy to the 
'Opinions of the CJ, Bhagwati J. observed. 
"If primacy were to be given to the opinion of CJI, 
it would, in effect & substance amount to concurrence 
because giving primacy would mean that his opinion must 
prevail over that of the CJ, HC & Governor of the state 
which means that the Central Govt, must accept his 
consultation, & not concurrence of the CJI that is 
provided in Article 217 (i)," 
The Court relied on the discussion which had taken 
place in the constituent Assembly. In Dr. Ambedkar's 
words; 
15. Supra note 8. pp. 202 
16. C.A.D., Vol VIII, at 258. 
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"To allow the CJ practically a veto upon the 
appointment of judges is really to transfer the authority 
to the CJ which we are not prepared to vest in the 
President or the Govt, of the day." 
He further comments : 
" Where a Judge of SC is to be appointed, the 
CJI is required to be consulted but again it is not 
concurrence but only ccnsulta tionarad the central Govt, is 
not bound to act in accordance with the opinion of CJI. The 
ultimate power to appoint rests with the Central Govt, and 
that is in accordance with the constitutional practice 
prevailing in all democratic countries. Even in U.K., from 
which we've inherited our system of administration of 
Justice, the appointments of HC Judges in made by or on 
the advice of Lord. Chancellor, who is member of cabinet 
while appointment to Court of Appeal and House of Lords 
and to the offices of Lord CJ, master of rolls & President 
of Family Division are made on the advice of the PM after 
II 
consultation with the Lord Chancellor . 
This is, of course, not an ideal system of 
appointment of judges but the reason why the power of 
oU 
appointment of judges is left to the Executive appears to 
be that Executive is responsible to the legislature and 
through legislature, it is accountable to the people who 
are consumers of justice , it is presumably. On this 
account that the power of appointment is entrusted to the 
18 Executive." 
The observation made by Dr. Ambedkar suggests that 
CJ has no final say in the appointment to judges nor could 
he veto an appointment. 
It would, therefore, be open to Central Govt, to 
override the opinion gives by all the constitutional 
functionaries, required to be consulted, and to arrive at 
its own decision in regard to the appointment of Judges in 
HCs or SC, S-o long as such decision is based on relevant 
considerations and is not otherwise malafide. Even if the 
opinion given by all the constitutional functionaries 
consulted by it, is identical, the central Govt, is not 
bound to act in accordance with such opinion. The only 
18. Ibid 
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ground on which such decision i.e. taken against unanimous 
opinion of all constitutional functionaries can be 
assailed, is that it is malafide or basea on irrelevant consi-
deration. 
But, where there is difference of opinion amongst 
the constitutional functionaries who are consulted, the 
question arises that, whose opinion should be given more 
weight or primecy. The learned nudges by majority held 
that it is difficult to see on what principle can Primacy 
be given to the opinion of one constitutional functionary 
when Art. 217 (i) places aiithe three functionaries on the 
same pedestal so far as the process of consultation is 
concerned and does not make any distinction between them. 
Justice Bhagwati holds : 
" it is true that CJI is the head of Indian 
Judiciary and may be figuratively discribed as pater 
familias of the brotherhood of judges but the CJ, HC is also 
an important functionaryand it is not possible to say that 
so far as the consultative process is concerned, he is in 
19 
any way less important than the CJI." 
19. Supra note 8 / PP- 201 
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He supports his formulation on the grounds that 
first of all; under constitutional scheme, CJ of HC is not 
subject to administrative suprintendence of CJI nor is he 
under his control or supervision Further, if we look at 
the language of Article 217 (i), we feel that opinion of 
CJ, HC must be given at least equal weight with the CJI 
opinion because, CJ, HC would be in better position to 
know about the competence, chracter and integrity of a 
person recommended for appointment of a judge in the High 
Court Similarly, opinion of the Governor of the State 
concerned would also be entitled to equal weight because 
he is the right person who can be in better position to 
express an opinion regarding the general character & 
integrity of person recommended, his antecedents & his 
social philosophy & value system. So, also the opinion of 
CJI would be valuable because he would not be afficted by 
cast, communal & other parochial considerations and 
standing outside the turmoil of local passions and 
prejudices. 
Therefore, opinion of each constitutional 
functionry is entitled to equal weight and it is not 
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possible to say ttet opinion of CJI wouldhave primacy over 
other two functionaries becuse if primacy were given to 
the opinion of CJI it would, in effect & substance amount 
to concurrence because giving primacy to his opinion would 
mean that Central Govt, is bound to accept his opinion but 
it has also been pointed out that Art. 217 (i) Provides 
only for consultation, not for concurrence. 
However, Justice Gupta, Justice Pathak and Justice, 
Tulzapurkar, while developing minority judgement, 
observed that the opinion of the CJI deserved primacy but 
could not act as veto. They, further, pointed out, 
forcefully that the sole reason for bringing in, CJI was 
to subject the recommendations of the CJ, HC to a screening 
process. The CJI has allthe material which the CJ of HC 
has before him with the addition of the opinion of the CJ 
himself. It is only after an objective assessment of the 
entire matter that Chief Justice sends his final 
recommendation to the President of India. 
While evaluating the S.P. Gupta decision 
critically, it may be submitted here that the minority 
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opinion is more cogent & instructive. Though, the 
constitution accords no primacy or veto to the CJI/ the 
consultative relationship between the CJI and the 
President may assume special significance if the 
recommendations made by the State Govt, differed from the 
recommendtions made by CJ, HC. In such a predicament, the 
CI, has a decisive role to play by making an objective 
assessment of the case and the President should give due 
weight to his recommendations. 
The resulting effect of the Court's ruling is that 
the power to appoint judges vests in the Govt. The advice 
given by the CJI has no binding force because consultation 
did not mean, concurrence. The Court has further clarified 
that even if the opinion given by all the constitutional 
functionaries is identical, the union govt, is not bound 
to accept it.Justice Bhagwati went to the extent of 
holding that Govt, of India is free to follow the advice 
of anyone of the three authorities e .g . of the state govt, 
in preference to the advice of the two Chief Justices. 
It is further submitted that the opinion of justice 
Bhagwati runs directly counter to the intention of the 
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framers of our constitution in enacting Article 217 as they 
had specific.ally rejected the English model of appointing 
judges because it gave absolute power to the Executive. 
The framers also rejected the American model because the 
power of the President regarding appointment of judges was 
subject to the veto of the senate. The principal reason 
for rejecting the above models was that both these 
approaches subject appointment of judges to political and 
legislative pressures. Hence, the framers adopted a middle 
course to avoid these pressures. This shows that the govt, 
was not supposed to take any direct part in the selection 
of judges. 
H.M. sservai seems to be right when he says : 
"The Chief justices are and the State Governments 
are not, qualified to judge the legal equipment, 
competence & suitability of a person to be appointed as 
High Court Judge."^° 
20. Supra note, 4 
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It is submitted that the Court has not been able to 
dwell upon the nature & scope of consultation among the 
four constitution! functionries provided by Article, 217 
of the constitution. The provision is silent about the 
role which each functionary is intended to play. 
In the opinion of Upendra Baxi the. Court's view 
is marked by incoherence futility and lack of 
21 perspecti.ve. 
Further more, the Court's opinion thatsince the 
Govt, is accountable to the people, it has final say in 
the appointment of judges, has been widely criticised. 
22 According to Ariin Shourie. 
'The key has been handed over to the robber 
the principle violator of all laws today the Executive 
has been given a near absolute right to determine who will 
hear us". 
21.Upendra Baxi : A Judiciary at the cross roads Vol. 9, 
J.B.C.I., 231 (1982). 
22.Arun Shourie, Mrs. Gandhi's Second Reign (1983). 
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Tb quote Seervai : 
" the SC failed to raise to the occasion to 
defend judicial independence because the majority 
judgement put the judiciary at the mercy of Govt, of India 
and theraby, unwiellingly destroyed judicial independence"^-^ 
Thus the views expressed by majority have definitely 
loured wered the emage of Judiciary because Judiciary 
itself empowered the biggest litigant in Indian to choose 
its own judges by disregarding the advice tendered by two 
chief justices. 
Moreover, the multiplicity of opinions expressed in 
the Judges Case opened the doors for politics and 
manipulations. Which in the ultimate analysis could destroy 
the independence of judiciary. By leaving theimp. matter of 
appointment of judges to the sweet will of the Executive 
which may be more interested in appointing judges who are 
prepared to dance to the tune of the Govt. judiciary 
inflicted a servere blow on its own independence, 
23. See Supra note-4, p. 2450, 
68 
Not only Such position, detrimental to the Judiciary but 
also to the justice itself, continued for not less than 
twelve years but fortunately'. Judiciary realized its 
mistake and has come out with a determined and confident 
assertionof 'Primacy of CJI opinion' over all others 
whosoever they may be, in matter of appointment of judges. 
With this fortunate assertion, the role of Executive has 
been reduced to minimum. 
This revolutionary trend was set up by the Supreme 
Court in S.C. Advocates. On recordAssocition v/s Union of 
X -^ 24 India 
P o p u l a r l y known as 'Second Judges ' c a s e . 
This landmark d e c i s i o n was rendered by 9 Judges 
bench cons i s t ed of S.R. Pandian , Kuldip Singh, J . S . Verma, 
Yogeshwar Dayal, G.N. Ray, A.S. Anand nd S.P. Bharucha J J . 
f o r major i ty while A.M. Ahmadi & M.M. Punchchi s tood fo r 
m i n o r i t y op in ion . 
24. AIR-1994, SC p . 268. 
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In this case, S.P. Gupta case has been specifically 
overruled and held that the opinion of CJI has primacy in 
the matter of appointment of HC & SC judges. 
The learned judges out^^ardly established that the 
view that Govt, can inexcusably ignore the opinion of CJI, 
expressed during the process of consultation as well as of 
CJ, HC and appoint its selectees on its own evaluation of 
the merit of the candidate, can not be a concievablelogical 
conclusion. It is so because the opinion of CJI, in the 
process of constitutional consultation in the matter of 
selection and appointment of judges is like the pope 
enjoying supremacy in the ecclesiastical & temporal 
affairs. The CJI being the highest judicial authority has a 
right of primacy, if not supremacy, to be accorded to his 
25 
opinion on theaffairs concerning the 'Temple of justice 
In the judges case I, Justice Bhagwati placed the 
opinion of CJI on par with the opinion of the other two 
constitutional functionaries viz. C J. HC & Governor of the 
25. Ibid, pp. 342 
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State, on the ground that Article. 217 (i) places all the 
three on the same pedestal so far as the process of 
consultation is concerned. But, in the Judges' case-II, 
the learned judges opine : 
"In our view, the bove holding by J. Bhagwati 
overlooks the very fact that the judicial service is not 
the service in the sense of employment; and is distinct 
from other services and that the members of the other 
services can not be placed on par with the members of 
the judiciary either constitutionally or functionlly" 
There are observed innumerable impelling factors 
which motivate, mobilise and import momentum to the 
concept that the opinion of the, CJI, given in the process 
of consultation, is entitled to have primacy. Those 
factors are being discussed in the following : 
"In the process of various constitutional 
appointments, 'Consultation is required only to the 
other higher ranking constitutional offices. The prior 
26. From. All India Judges' Assn & others case (1993) 
4JT, 618 SC, 
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consultation envisaged in the First Proviso to the Article 
124 (2) and Article 217(i) in respect of judicial offices 
is a reservation on limitation on the power of the 
president to appoint the judges of the superior courts. 
The Consultation by the President is a sine qua non or a 
condition. Precedent to the exercise of the constitutional 
power by the president to appoint judges. The consultation 
during the process in which an advice is sought by the 
president can't be esily brushed aside as an empty 
formality or a futile exercise or rrere casual or attached 
with no sanctity. The context in which the expression 
"shall", always be consulted" is used in the first proviso 
of Article 124(2) and the expression" shall be appointed 
after consultation" is deployed in Article 217(i), 
denotes the mandatory cliaiacter of 'Consultation' which has 
27 to be and is of a binding character 
The President is constitutionally obliged to 
consult the CJI alone in the caseof appointment of a judge 
27. Supra note 24, pp. 341-342. 
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to SC as per the mandatory, proviso to Article, 124(2) and 
in the case of appointment of a judge to the High Court 
the President is obliged to consult the CJI, the 
Governorof the State and in addition, the CJ, HC concerned 
in case, the appointment is related to a judge other than 
the CJ of that High Court. Therefore, to place the opinion 
of the CJI at par with the other constitiutional 
functionaries is not in consonance with the spirit of the 
Constitution, but against the very nature of the subject 
matter concerning the judiciary and in opposition to the 
context in which 'consultation' is required. 
It is true that while recommending a condidate for 
a higher state judiciary, the CJ, HC has the advantage of 
prosimity in evaluating the calibre and legal ability of 
the candidate. However, the CJI, before whom the opinion 
of CJ, HC, as well as of State Govt, is placed with all 
the relevant materials concerning the proposal, is in a 
better position either to accept the recommendation or 
reject it for strong and cogent reasons to be recorded. 
The merit of a candidate with regard to his or her 
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professional attainments, legal soundness, ability, 
skill etc. can be evaluated only by the C J, HC in the 
matter of appointment of judges to the HC and by CJI in 
the matter of appointment of a judge to the SC. However, 
since the judiciary does not have sufficient machinary 
of its own to check the antecedents and background of a 
candidate, the CJ, HC and the CJI may not be in a 
position to express any opinion about the conduct 
character & antecedents of the candidate. But the Govt, 
with its powerful machinary can check the antecedents & 
background of the candidate and give its opinion on the 
aspect. 
Therefore, when a recommendation of the CJ, HC 
comes to CJI with all particulars, he will be in a 
better position on examination of all the materials 
placed before him to evaluate the fitness of the 
candidate. 
Thus, the learned judges by majority asserted with 
full force that - "In all circumstances, the opinion 
of CJI is entitled to have the right of primacy in the 
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matter of selelction of judges to the SC as well as to 
the HC"^^. 
The hon'ble judges also supported their stand on 
the ground that though/ the President makes appointment 
to various constitutional offices besides appointing the 
HC & SC judges, but no consultation is provided with 
regard to the constitutional offices except judicial 
offices. The specific provisions for consultation with 
regardto judicial offices under constitution, clearly 
indicatethat said consultation is different in nature & 
meaning that the consultation as ordinarily understood. 
Independence of judiciary is the basic feature of the 
constitution and power and functions of three wings of 
the Govt, has been precised defined & demarcated under 
constitution. The judiciary is separate & the executive 
has no concern with the day to day functioning of the 
judiciary. The persons to be selected for aijpointment to 
judicial offices are only those who are functioning 
within the judicial sphere and are known to the judges 
28. Supra note-24, pp. 342. 
75 
of the superior Courts. The Executive can have no 
knowledge about their legal suitability for, appointment 
to the high judicial officers. In the process of 
consultation, the expertise to pick up the right person 
for appointment, is only with the judiciary. The 
'Consultation'. Therefore, is between a layman 
(Executive) and a specialist (Judiciary). It goes 
without saying that the advice of specialist has a 
bending effect. The requirement of prior consultation 
with CJI in the form of limitation placed by framers of 
the Indian Constitution, is a logical consequence of 
having an independent judiciary as a basic feature of 
the constitution. The learned judges, delivering rr->ajority 
judgement held. 
"if the Executive is left to ignore the advice 
tendered, by CJI, in the process of consultation, the 
very purpose and object of providing consultation with 
the judiciary is defeated. The Executive, therefore, is 
bound by the advice/recommendation of CJI in the process 
29 
of consultation under Articlesl24 (2) & 217 (1)" 
29. Supra note- 24, pp-412 
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Further, observed : 
"There can't be independent judiciary where the 
power of appointment of superior judges in vested in the 
Executive because the independence of the judiciary is 
in extricably linked and connected with the 
constitutional process of appointment of judges of the 
higherjudiciary. The framers of the constitution could 
never have intended to give such significant power to 
the Executive. 
Even otherwise the Govts. Central or the state are 
parties before the courts in large number of cases. The 
Union Executive have vital interests in various 
important matters which come for adjudication before the 
apex court. The Executive in one form or the other is 
the largest single litigant before the courts. In this 
view of the matter, the judiciary being the mediator 
between the people and the Executive the framers of the 
constitution could not have left the final authority to 
appoint the judges of the SC & HCS in hands of the 
..30 Executive. 
30. Ibid, p - 400 
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Justice Vermafor himself and on behalf of Justice 
Dayal, Justice Ray & Justice Bharucha observed that the 
primacy to the Executive is negatived by the departure 
made in the constitutional scheme from the appointment 
of judges of federal court and High Courts under the 
Govt, of India Acts (1919 & 1935). In these Acts, 
appointment of judges of the federal court & High Courts 
were in the absolute discretion of the crown with no 
specific provision for consultation with the C J. When 
the constitution was being drafted, there was general 
agreement that the appointment of judges in the superior 
judiciary should not be left to the absolute discretion 
of the Executive in order to achieve independence of 
the judges of superior judiciary even at the time of 
their appointment. It is the reason which impelled the 
incorportion of the obligation of consultation with the 
CJI and the CJ, HC under Article - 124 (2) & 217(1). The 
phraseology used indicates that giving absolute 
discretion or the power of veto to the CJI as an 
individual in the matter of appointments is not 
desirable, so that, there should remain some power with 
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the Executive to be exercised as check whenever 
necessary. The indication is that in the choice of a 
candidate suitable for appointment the opinion of CJI 
should have the greatest weight , the selection should 
be made as a result of a participatory consultative 
process in which the Executive should have power to act 
as mere check on the exercise of power by CJI, to 
achieve the constitutional purpose. 
So, by this formulation, the executive element in 
the appointment process is reduced to minimum & any 
political, influence is eliminated. It was for this 
reason that the word, 'Consultation' instead of 
'concurrence' was used, but that was done merely to 
indicate that absolute discretion was not given to 
anyone, not even to CJI as an individual much less to 
theExecutive which earlier,had absolute discretion under 
the Govt, of India Acts. 
The learnedjudges while deciding the Second Judges 
case criticised the S.P. Gupta ruling saying that the 
majority view in the S. P. Gupta to the effect that "the 
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Executive should have primacy since it is accountable to 
the people, while Judiciary has no such accountability, 
is an easily exploded myth, a bubble, that va-nishes on a 
mere touch. In short, the whole assumption had no real 
, • „31 basis 
They observed that in actual practice, the CJI, CJ, 
HC being responsible for the functioning of the courts 
have to face the consequence of any unsuitable 
appointment which gives rise to criticism levelled by 
the ever vigilant Bar. 
Thus, in their view, in actual practice, the real, 
accountability, in such matters, is of judiciary and not 
of the Executive, who has always held out, that except 
for rare instances, the Executive is guided in the 
matters of appointments by the CJI' s opinion and if that 
is the actual position in practising the constitutional 
provisions relating to the appointment of judges, 
wherein Executive itself gives primacy to the opinion of 
31. Ibid, p-431. 
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CJI and in the matters of accountability also, it 
indicates the primary responsibility of CJI, it stands 
to reason that the actual practice being in confirmity 
with the constitutional scheme, should also be accorded 
legal sanction by permissible constitutional 
interpretation. 
Therefore, the primary aim must be to reach an 
agreed decision taking into account the views of all 
consultees, giving greatest weight to the opinion of 
CJI, who is best suited to know the worth of the 
appointee. No question of primacy would arise when the 
decision is reached by consensus. However, if 
conflicting opinions emerge at theend of the process, 
then, in such eventuality, question of primacy arises. 
In such case, giving primacy to the Executive is 
negatived by the historical change and the nature of 
functions required to be performed by each. The primacy 
must, therefore,lie in the final opinion of CJI, unless 
for very good reasons^ known to the Executive and 
disclosed to the CJI, that appointment is not considered 
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to be suitable. The primacy of the opinion of CJI formed 
collectively, after taking into account, the views of 
his senior colleagues who are required to be consulted 
by him for the formation of his opinion. 
The minority judgement, in Second Judges case was 
delivered by Justice Ahmadi and Justice Punchchi who 
stood dissented from the decision of rest of their friends constituting 
the bench. 
The dissentingjudgesheld that majority view of S.P. 
Gupta does not require reconsideration on this aspect of 
matter because relevant Article of our constitution does 
not support the view that the CJI shouldhave the last 
word in matter of selection. 
Justice Ahmadi observed that in all the models of 
Judicial Selection employed in different countries, 
namely, U.S., U.K., Aastralia, Canada, the Executive has 
been empowered to make appointments to superior 
judiciary. Our constitutional framers have charted a 
middle course by providing for 'prior consultation' with 
the judiciary before the President makes appointments. 
Therefore, however convincing it may sound to the ideal 
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of 3udicial independence that the views of CJI must have 
primacy^ the submission can't be accepted unless, the 
constitution is amended because as the constitutional 
provisions concerned presently stand, the submission 
based on the time of reasoning is unacceptable. 
The concept of primacy to the accorded to the views 
of CJI has three elements viz-(i) Primacy as 'Pater 
familias ' of Indiaan judiciary (ii) Primacy to be given 
because it is provided by in Articles 124 (2) & 217 (1) 
and ; (iii) Primacy in the sense, the CJI opinion would 
be binding on the Executive and the position of CJI 
under constitution is of primus inter pares i.e. First 
among equal. But, dissenting Judges donot agree with these 
propositions as they hold that although, the views of 
CJI may be entitled to great weight, he does not enjoy a 
right of veto in the sense that the President is not 
bound to act according to his views. However, his views 
would be of higher value vis-a-vis the views of his 
colleagues forbidding the President from relying on 
them. The views of the CJI can not eclipse the views of 
other consultees. 
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In the Judges 'Case II, the counsel for petitioners 
made the submission that even the Govt, of India has 
construed the provisions as conferringprimacy on the CJI 
which is quite clear by considering the the fact that 
in the last decade, out of total 5 47 appointments made 
from 1 Jan, 1983 to 10 April, 1993, to different courts 
only 7 appointments were made contrary to the views of 
CJI, which is speaking evidence of the Executive, having 
conceded primacy to the opinion of CJI. But Justice 
Ahmadi finds it difficult to appreciate the submission. 
He says that in fact, seven instances of departure from 
the views of CJI are the cases of assertion which negate 
the inference of submission to the theory of Primacy and 
these all are Post S.P. Gupta instances which 
individually & collectively provide evidence of 
assertion of Executive's right to make an appointment 
departing from the views expressed by CJI & denial of 
concept of Primacy to be attached to the views of 
latter. 
Even, under the Bill for setting up National 
Judicial. Commission for recommending appointments to SC 
& HCS introduced in Lok Sabha; the last word in the 
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matter of choice for an appointment to the SC or HC was 
not left with the CJI. Thus, observe dissenting judges, 
even the developments subsequent to AIR, 1982 don't 
support the proposition that CJI should have primacy in 
matters of appointments to superior judiciary. 
The further said that it is one thing to say the 
great weight should be attached to the opinion of CJI 
and it is another thing to say that amongst the 
consultees; his word will be final because it is very 
difficult to hold that the entire judiciary is 
symbolised in the view of CJI and President is bound to 
act in accordance therewith. 
Our constitution, consisted of various checks & 
balances, the absolute power of the executive in the 
choice of members of the superior judiciary, is 
controlled, by the need for prior consu]tation with the 
judicial wing. 
Moreover, even the plain language of the relevant 
Articles of the constitution does not support the theory 
of veto in the CJI i.e. there is no indication to 
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support the aryument that the CJI, should have the last 
word in the selection of persons for appointment or 
rejection of a person suggested by other functionaries 
or consultees. It must be realized that the concept of 
primacy has, in the context, two aspects : 
(i) Primacy in the sense of opinion of CJI being the 
last word binding on the consultant; and 
(ii) Primacy in the sense that the opinion of CJI would 
prevail over the views of other consultees if they 
are conflicting. 
Regarding these two concepts, the dissenting judges 
observed : 
"In the first place, there is no warrant in the 
constitutional scheme to hold that any hierachy was 
intended amongst the consultees. In the second oplace 
the CJI is, undoubtedly, pater familias of 
Indian judiciary but the constitution nowhere confers 
on him the power to eclipse the view of his co-equals. 
If such a view is taken, the provision of the 
consultation with others mentioned in the Article-124 
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(2) will be rendered nugatory since under the proviso, 
* 
CJI has always to be consulted" . 
Thus, it is submitted that the minority view 
remained stuck to the majority opinion in S.P. Gupta, 
but the judges in majority left no stone unturned in 
asserting the CJI as final & decisive authority in 
appointment matters & in making the role of President as 
submissive. 
Comparative Study of Judges Case - I 
and Judges Case - II 
It one makes a comparative study of S.P. Gupta & 
Second Judges' Case, it seems that the learned judges in 
both the cases are unanimously agreed asto the meaning of 
consultation used in Article 124 (2) & 217 (1). None 
of judges favoured the formulation that 'Consultation' 
should mean 'Concurrence .Even though, the majority in 
Second Judges Case, overruled the S.P. Gupta decision to 
a great extent but it did so keeping in view of the real 
*. Ibid, pp - 385. 
intent hidden behind the minds of constitution- makers 
in using the term 'Consultation'. 
No doubt the learned judges holding majority 
opinion, have formulated that CJI will have final say in 
the matter of appointment of judges of SC and enjoy 
primacy in the appointment of High Court judges, but 
they simultaneously asserted that the primacy aim must 
be to reach an agreed decision taking into account the 
views of all the consultees, giving the greatest weight 
to the opinion of CJI. 
Although, majority of judges in both the cases 
differs on the point asto how much weight to be accorded 
to the opinion of CJI, yet in both the rulings, the 
learned judges left no stone unturned in ensuring that 
CJI can not be left free to act in arbitrary manner, at 
his own sweet will. 
Thus, it is submitted here tht it is the opinion of 
CJI formed collectively,after having taken into account 
the views of his senior colleagues, which has been 
accorded primacy, not the CJI opinion alone. 
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If one analyses the majority judgement of S.P. 
Gupta and minority judgement of Second judges case, it 
would become clear that both the judgements have 
proceeded on the same line and have same reason & 
rationale behind their formulations. 
Besides all this, the minority in 'Second Judges' 
Case, seems to have supported its holding on the sound 
basis that in the last decade, from 1983 to 1993, the 7 
glaring instances of appointments made contrary to the 
views of CJI, are quite sufficient to negate the 
inference of submission to the theory of primacy, and 
these all are post S.P. Gupta instances which 
individually & collectively provide the evidence of 
assertion of Executive's right to make appointments 
departing from the views of the CJI and denial of the 
concept of primacy to be attached to the views of the 
latter. 
The learned judges for minority also made clear 
that under the bill for setting up National Judicial 
Commission for recommending appointments to SC & HCS 
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introduced in Lok Sabha, the last word in the matter of 
choice for such appointment was not left with the CJI. 
Thus even the developments subsequent to 1982 don't 
support the proposition that CJI should have primacy in 
such matters. 
While studying the minority judgement in S.P. 
Gupta and the majority one in Second Judges case, one 
thing immediately strikes the mind that majority in the 
latter case has had the minority opinion in S.P. Gupta 
as basis for their holding. 
But majority has come out more boldly on the point 
that CJI should have final say the appointment matters. 
While judges for minority view in S.T. Gupta held that 
CJI's opinion should be given greatest weight among 
other constitutional functionaries, they did not place 
the CJI above the Executive in the matters of 
appointment of judges. 
In this respect, the Second case differs slightly 
as herein, the learned judges have succeeded in passing 
the impression that it is no one but the CJI whose 
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opinion will have primacy, if not supremacy and 
President can not ignore the advice tendered by CJI in 
the process of consultation Othewise, the very purpose 
and object of providing for consultation with the 
judiciary would stand defeated. 
Therefore, the Executive is hence forth bound by 
the advice or recommendation of the Chief justice in the 
process of consultation under Article - 124 (2) & 217 
(1). 
Thus, it is submitted here that minority in S.P. 
Gupta could not assert itself with so much boldness/ 
force & clarity as the majority has done it in Second 
Judges case. 
Any way 
IT IS BETTER LATE THAN NEVER 
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PART - C Appointment of Chief Justice and Conventional 
Principle of Seniority 
The Chief Justice of India is the highest 
judicial authority in the country and Chief Justice of 
the State is the highestjudicial authority of that 
State's judicial system. 
However, the framers of our constitution have 
made no mandatory provision for 'Consultation' for the 
appointment of the CJI and the CJ of HC. Though under 
Articles 124 (2) & 217 (1), President, in appointing 
other judges of SC & HC,is bound to consult CJI, but in 
appointing the CJI, he is not bound to consult anyone. 
The word 'may' used in Article - 124 makes it clear that 
it is not mandatory on him to consult anyone. 
The idea for not making a specific provision for 
the appointment of Chief Justices appears to be that 
these, two positions were intended to be filled up on the 
principle of seniority. This view because firmly 
established because till 1973,the practice was to appoint 
the semior most 3udge of the SC as the CJI. This 
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practice had virtually been transformed into a convention 
and was followed by the Executive without any exception. 
Although in 1956 the Law Commission, headed by 
the then Attorney General M.C. Setalvad, criticised this 
practice of appointing senior- most judge as CJ and 
recommended that in appointing the CJI, the experience of 
a person as a judge, his administrative competence and 
merit should be judged and seniority should not only be 
the main consideration. The Law Commission had said : 
" We have referred to the high and important 
duties which the Chief Justice of India is called upon to 
perform. It is obvious that succession to an office of 
this character can not be regulated by mere seniroty. For 
the performance of the duties of the CJI, needed, 
not only a judge of ability & experience, but also a 
competent administrator capable of handling complex 
matters , a person of sturdy independence and towering 
personality who would be a watch dog of the 
independence of judiciary . It is, therefore, 
necessary to set a healthy convention that appointment to 
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the office of the CJ rests on special considerations and 
does not as a matter of course go to the senior-most puisne 
judge such a convention should be establishedeven in 
32 
the case of appointment of CJ of the High Court ." 
The recommendation of the Law Commission had lain 
dormant for over 14 years as no attempt was made by the 
Govt, to implement it. Instead, the Govt, continued to 
follow the principle of seniority as a matterof rule in 
appointing Chief Justices. 
Suddenly, the recommendation sprang into active, life 
when the 22 years old practice was broken by the Govt, on 
April, 23, 1973, a day after a bench of 13 judges 
deliveredjudgement in the Fundamental Rights Case. Mr. 
Justice Ray was appointed Chief Justice of India, 
superseding three judges senior to him, Mr. Justice Shelat, 
Mr. Justice Hegde and Mr. Justice Grover, all of whom 
resigned. A stormy political & personal controversy arose as 
a result of this appointment. 
32. Law Commission of India, Fourteenth Report, Vol. 1/ 
39-40 (1959). 
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On the day, the Chief Justice was sworn in, a 
joint statement was issued over the signatures of emi^nent 
retired judges and lawyers condemning the supersession as 
"a manifest attempt to undermine the court's independence" 
The statement said : 
"It cannot be devried that the three judges more passed 
over only because their rulings displeased the Govt. 
There can be no two opinion regarding the calibre and 
total suitability of each of the three superseded judges; 
two of them have alredy served with distinction as Chief 
Justices of High Courts". ^^ 
There we re protests from various Bar asociations, 
discussions in Press and a remarkable press conference by 
Mr. Justice Hegde on May 1, 1973. 
33. Mr. M.C. Setalvad a former Att. Gen. of India; 
Mr. M.C. Chagla, a former CJ of Bombay; 
Mr. J.C. Shah, former CJI, Mr. K.T. Desai. 
a former CJ of Gujrat, Mr. V.M. Tarkunde a former 
judge of the Bom. HC and a senior advocates Mr. N.A. 
Palkhiwala, a leadinc, senior Advocate :A. Judiciary made 
measure by Palkhiv;ala , t;. 36 
34. Ibid p. 35 
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Before this, on April 28, 1973 The Statesman 
criticised the Govt, action as follows : 
"New Delhi's sudden decision to reject the 
convention whereby the senior most judge of the SC is 
appointed CJ, has shaken the judicial system to its 
foundations. Both the decision and the manner in v/hich 
it was taken have arroc,ated to the executive an authority 
entirely hostile to the sprit of democratic 
35 institution" 
The Govt., however, sought to justify its action 
on the grounds that it was well within the 
constitutional rights in departing from the past 
practice of appointing senior most judge as CJ. It 
pointed out that the appointment was consistent with the 
constitutional provisions & the practice followed in 
other democratic countries as Article - 124 did not 
provide for appointing senior most judge as the CJ and 
Article 126 relating to acting CJ made it clear that any 
35. The Statesman : Article-Beginning of the End; April 
28, 1973. 
96 
of the judges could be appointed. Thus, there may have 
been some obligation to consult the CJ in the 
appointment of the judges to the SC, no such duty was 
enjoined in the choice of his succession. The Govt, 
justified its action by propounding theory of 'Committed 
Judiciary' through Mr. Kumarmanglam, then minister of 
steel. He claimed that judicial appointment including 
that of CJI was a prerogative of the Govt, and all such 
appointments cannot be made without looking into the 
"Social philosophy of the judges". He pointed out :" The 
Govt, of India should have judges who are committed not 
only to the 'Social philosphy of the Constitution but 
also to that of the Govt." 
The holding of Mr. Kumarmanglam was clearly to 
the effect that Govt, is the final authority to judge 
the judge's philosphy. The Govt, found the social 
philosphy of Justice Ray more progressive and forward 
looking in comparison to that of his other senior 
36. Rajeev Dhawan, Justice on trial: The SC Today ; 7 2 
(1980) . 
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colleagues who thwarted various socio-economic measures 
introduced by Parliament and took a confrontational 
instance. 
While justifying its unprecedented move, the 
37 Govt, also invoked the authority of Law Commission. 
Regarding the various reasons & justifications, 
given by the Govt, it is submitted that it is true that 
the president lias absolute discretion to appoint any 
judge of SC as CJI, whom he finds suitable for the post, 
but, since 1951 he never exercised his discretion. 
Instead he chose to follow the practice of appointing 
senior most judge as CJI and such practice which 
continued for a long period of 22 years, remained no 
more a practice but because a well established 
convention by virtue of time. 
Mr. Kumarmanglam's thesis asto 'Social philosphy 
of judges' & his theory of Committed judiciary' received 
severe criticisum from his own professional fraternity. 
37. Law Commission of India : 14th Report (1959). 
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3 8 According to Seer\Qi / the 'Social philosphy 
Theory' could not be sustained, though many eminent 
authorities on American Constitution and other federation 
held the same opinion. 
Justice Hidaytullah, former CJI castigated the 
Govt, by saying that the judges appointed in accordance 
with this theory are persons who are "not forward 
" o q II 
looking but looking backward.^In his view , to talkabout 
one philosphy as the yardstick to judge the appointment 
of a judge is to distort the constitution beyond 
.,40 
recognition. 
N.A. Palkhiwla, a noted constitutional jurist 
observed/ "Govt wanted that the CJ should subscribe not 
only to the philosphy of the constitution, but also to 
the philosphy of dictators & absolute monarchs like the 
41 
old kings who established star Chamber." 
38. H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Vol II 
at 1419 (2nd Edn, 1979) 
39. See. N.A. Palkhiwala, Supra-note 34^at 13. 
40. Ibid. 
41. Ibid, pp. 124. 
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It is submitted here that above criticjism 
definitely tends to show that Govt, shouldhave the least 
say in the appointment ofjudges including the Chief 
Justice because in evaluating the social philosphy of 
judges, the Govt, becomes judge in its own cause as it is 
the biggest single litigant in the country and is bound 
to take any judgement against it as wrong. 
Sofar as the argumentof Govt. regarding the 
recommendations of Law Commission is concerned, it also 
does not hold ground. First of all, the reports of Law 
Commission were not impleimented for a about 17 years. 
In words of K. Subba Rao, the former CJI ," the report 
was impliedly rejected by long inaction but was revived 
suddenly on April 25, 1973, to sustain n indefensible 
action' ,..42 
43 Secondly, Dr. J.N. Pandey submits that report of Law 
Commission itself destroyed the Govt's case. Had the 
42. K. Subba Rao-The Supersession of judges. The price 
of Executive Interference Souvenir, published by 
Bar Council, U.P., : 83 
43. J.N. Pandey: Constitutional law of India, (1989) 
20th Edn. pp. '303. 
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Govt, followed the recommendation of the Commission, the 
three senior judges would not have been superseded. The 
44 
report itself lays down the qualification of the CJI. 
Thus, when the Law Commission recommended for 
appointing, the CJI on merit, & not on seniority, it did 
not mean that merit from the point of view of the 
Executive. The three senior and eminent judges \./e.re 
superseded not because they did not possess the 
qualifications recommended by Law Commission but because 
they had decided cases against the Govt. 
The Law Commission also recommended for 
establishing a healthy convention before any such 
appointment was made. In the present case, the 
appointment was made without establishing a new 
convention : "If the Govt, merely wanted to carry out 
the recommendation it could have declared the new 
convention in advance and taken the Bar & the public into 
confidence but instead the letter & the sprit of the 
44. Supra note -32 of Chapter-IV, part-C. 
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Commission Report were flouted and the judges were 
passed over merely because their decision went against 
the Govt."^^ 
Even Mr. Setalvad,^^ one of the signatories to 
the Law Commission's Report criticised the Supersession 
by saying that "the action of the Govt in not following 
the seniority principle was completely dishonest". 
The above criticism affirms that the decision of 
the Govt, was ill conceived and politically motivated in 
superseding three senior judges in 1973. 
The secondsupersession controversy arose in 
January, 1977. The Govt, appointed Mr. Justice M.H. Beg 
as CJI, superseding a judge senior to him Mr. Justice 
H.R. Khanna who also resigned in protest. 
This time, the govt, did not talk about the 
'Social Philosphy of Judges 1 It was explained that 
the senior most judge would have served a very short 
term as Chief Justice, an argument totally unconvincing 
45. See Supra note 32. pp. 43 
46. M.C. Setalvad; An indepeident Judiciary and a 
Democratic State, 90 (1977). 
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47 because there has hitherto been short terms of CJs. 
Some people felt that Justice Khanna's dissent in 
48 famous Habeas corpus case cost him the office of the 
49 CJI . 
In Feb. 1978, third successive controversy about 
the appointment of CJI started. Mr. Justice Chandrachud 
& Mr. Justice, Bhagwati were singled out for criticism 
because they were the senior most judges if the criteria 
of senioritywas to be followed. 
However, the controversy receded in the 
background when Mr. Justice Chandrachud, the senior most 
judge was appointed as the CJI. 
After the tiring discussion regarding appointment 
of Chief Justice it is submittedhere that the above 
47. Out of 17 retired CJIs, the shortest term has been 
of Mr. Mustice J.C. Shah. He served for total 
period of 35 days. 
48. A.D.M. Jabalpur v/s S. Shukla,AIR-1976, SC, 1207. 
49. H.M. Seervai, The Emergency, Future Safeguards & 
the Habeas Corpus Case : A Criticism. 58 (1976) 
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unfortunate instances clearly indicate the absence of any 
healthy convention in appointing Chief Justices which 
leaves room for political interference in imp. matter of 
appointment to highest judicial post. The present state 
of affairs leads to a genuine impression that there is 
I 
great need of 'Uniformity as well as 'Security from 
political interference' in such an important matter.. 
And such need can alone be fulfilled by resorting back 
to the conventional principle of seniority. 
It is true enough that age or experience is not 
necessarily conclusive ofjudicial or any other kind of 
wisdom, though in the case of persons, all of whom 
areabove sixty;, arguments about the relative merit of 
age & Youth are somewhat unreal. It is not that the 
principle of seniority is sacrosanct in itself or even a 
sound one in most context. But, its advantage in the 
Choice of CJ is that it provides, "a certain continuity ,& 
automaticism that avoids occasions for the kind of 
factitious controversies that have been generated by 
the present appointment (appointment of Justice Ray in 
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(1973)"^° 
The point is not that the selection of a CJ on 
merit is unacceptable in principle but that it is a 
method liable to expose the judiciary to an acceptable 
degree of political interference. It is doubtful, in 
Indian context, aste whether the Executive is properly 
equipped to assess judicial merit or that such assessment 
with the best of intentions will not be coloured by 
political considerations. 
Thus, the principle of seniority is much more 
desirable in the wake of above mentioned controversives 
& to bring uniformity and continuity in the matter 
concerned. 
50. Hindustan Times : 'A controversial Appointment ;April 
27, 1973. 
CHAPTER - V 
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CHAPTER - V 
TRANSFER OF HIGH COURT JUDGES 
Transfer of B.C. Judyes is another matter which 
has aroused strong emotions in the context of the 
independence of Judiciary. 
The provision relatini^ to 'Transfer Power' is 
contained in Article 222 of the Constitution. Article 222 as 
amended by the Fifteenth Constitutional as Amendment-'-read as 
follows : 
(1) The President may, after consultation with the Chief 
Justice of India, transfer a Judge from one High Court 
to any other High Court. 
(2) When a Judge has beenor is so transferred, he shall, 
during the period he serves, after the commencement of 
the constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act 1963, as a 
Judge of the other High Court, be entitled to 
receive in addition to his salary such compensatory 
allowance as may be determined, such compensatory 
allowance as the President may beorder fix". 
Under the Provision concerned, there seems no 
guarantee against the abuse of 'Transfer Power' by the 
1. Constitution (Fifteen Amendment) Act, 1963. 
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Executive and this very power, infact, was used and abused 
duriny the period of Emeryency (1975-77) when as many as 16 
judges were transfered from their respective Hiyh Court. The 
names of 40 more judyes were leaked out to press to 
threaten the H C judiciary. In fact, this weapon was used 
ayainst all those judyes who had shown couraye, conviction & 
Fearlessness in deliveriny their decisions & refused to toe 
the line of the Govt. To quote Untwalia J. 
" the order of transfer of so many judyes 
at one & the same time created a sense of Fear & panic in 
the minds of the judyes and others throuyhout the country 
and led them to suspect stronyly that the orders of 
transfers were made by & larye in the case of juydes who 
had shown exemplary couraye & independence even duriny the 
period of emeryency in deliveriny the judyements in many 
MISA cases.... But one thiny is certain, and I ayain take 
couraye to say so with utmost responsibility that the panic 
created had shaken the very foundation & structure of the 
2 
independence of judiciary throuyhout the country." 
The post emeryency court had to deal with the 
appeal by the union concerniny the transfer of a Justice 
Sankalchand Sheth of Gujrat Hiyh Court to the A.P. Hiyh 
Court as an aspect of the mass transfer of judyes duriny 
Emeryency. 
2. Union of India v/s Shankalchand, AIR 1977, SC PP 23.89 
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Justice Sheth questioned the transfer in 
Gujrat Hiyh Court and it struck down the transfer. The 
union filed an appeal to the SC but, by the time, the SC 
could pronounce its judc,ement, the heat had been taken off 
the said case durin<^ owin9 to the cessation of the 
Emertjency and the Govt, promisincj to re-transfer J. Sheth to 
Gujrat. The govt, also re-transfered all those who had 
been transfered to their respective Hicjh Courts. 
But, the decisions both at the Hiyh Court and 
the SC level, contain a whole ranye of exciting juris 
prudential questionsconcerniny the power of President under 
Article 222 are extremely important. 
These.vital questiohsinvolved are : -
(i) Can and should Article 222 be read as requiring 
that the President should obtain the ccarsent of the 
affected judye before makiny the transfer? 
(ii) Is the power of the President under Article 222 
unfettered? 
(iii) What are the conditions for the exercise of such 
discretionary power, and 
(iv) Can the nature of discretionary power exercised by 
the President be reviewed by the Court on the basis 
of the principles of administrative law? 
These questions came up for consideration of 
3 
the SC in Union of India v/s Sankalchand 
In this case, the constitutionality of a 
notification issued by the president by which J. 
3. AIR 1977 SC, 2328 
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Sheth. was transferred, was challanyed on the ground 
that order. was passed without the consent of 
thejud^e and against public interest and without 
effective consultation of the CJI. 
The SC by a majority of 3:2 led by justice 
Chandrachud, Justice Krishna Iyer & Justice Fazal 
Ali, held that a judge of HC could be transferred 
under Article 222 (i) without his consent and 
Consent could not be read in Article 222. If 
consent was imported in Article 222 so asto make 
condition precedent to transfer judge from on HC to 
another, then, a judge by withholding consent could 
render the power contained in Article 222 wholly 
ineffective & hugatory. 
In this case, only justice Bhagwati Justice 
Untwalia stood dissent and justice Bhagwati alone 
read in Article 222 (1) the requirement of the 
concerned judges having to consent because the 
requirementof previous consultation with the CJI was 
not sufficient safeguard to preserve Judicial 
independence.. 
Justice Untwalia who was unable to read the 
requirement of consent into Article, rested his view 
on the ground that the transfer of a judge involved 
not only fresh appointment but a fresh oath_. 
On the second issue, the majority of the SC 
agreed with the opinion of Gujrat H C that the 
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principle of "Effective" consultation was absolutely 
vital in the exercise of Article 222 power. On this 
point J. Bhagwati also agreed with the majority. 
The majority led by Justice Chandrachud held, 
cateyorically that on effective consultation with 
the CJI was the condition precedent to the exercise 
of the power under Article 222 and that meant that 
all relevant data must be made available suo mote 
or upon request to the CJ as this was necessary for 
delibration which is " the quintessence of 
consultation". For this reason policy "transfers on 
a wholesale basis", which leave no scope for 
careful delibration of "the facts of each particular 
case", and which are "influenced by one sided 
yovernmental considerations" are " outside the 
contemplation of our constitution."^ 
Quoting Justice Krishna Iyer and Justice 
5 Bhaywati m Shamsher Singh Justice Chandrachud 
endorsed their view that the"last word in such a 
sensetive subject must belong to the CJI" He expre-
sses tj^ e hope that" these words will not fall on 
deaf ears"' 
4. Ibid P 2330 
5. AIR 1974, SC, 2192 
6. Supra note 3, P 23^2, 
7. Ibid 
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Justice Krishna Iyer, with whom Justice 
Bhaywati, pointedly ayrees, observed that the parties in 
consultation are "high level functionaries and the impact of 
Q 
erroneous judgment can be calamitous." . 
But Iyer J. maintains that -
"Consultation is different from consentaneity", the two 
diynitaries may "discuss", but disagree, they may "confer" 
9 but may not concur " _. 
Upendra Baxi points out that though there 
was consensus between H C & S C on the point that 
consultation must be effective but there lies a fundmental 
difference on the question of application of the priiciple 
of Natural Justice. While High Court contemplates the 
possibility of application of principle of Natural Justice 
to transfer of judges SC expressly disapproves the view and 
appears to be against the extension of the principle of 
Natural Justice as this would lead to many " unpractical 
anomalies and absurd results." It also feels that once CJI 
happens to get relevant material in advising the President, 
no further question of application of other principles of 
administrative justice may arise. 
It is submitted here that the whole impact of 
Sheth's decision seems to be that the power of the president 
under Article 222 is not unfettered. It is a power 
8. I bid p. 2379 
9. I bid p. 2380 
10. Upendra Baxi. : The Indian SC & Politics (1980) p 202 
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conferred by the Constitution in Public Interest and not for 
the purpose of providiny the Executive with a weapon to 
punish a judcje. Thus, the extra ordinary power conferred on 
the president can not be exercised in a manner which is 
calculated to defeat or destroy in one stroke the object & 
purpose of the various provisions concerned with a view to 
keep judiciary free from the interference of the Executive 
Once, it is accepted that a High Court judge can be 
transferred on the ground of Public Interest' only, the 
apprehension that the Executive may use the power of 
transfer for its ulterior ends and thereby interfere with 
the independence of judiciary, loses its force. 
The matter regarding 'Transfer Power' again 
came up for consideration before the SC in the case 
S.P.Gupta v/s Union of India.H" 
Where the following contentions were urged by 
Mr. Seervai.who led the others on the question of Transfer: 
(i) Althogh, it was clear from the language of Article 
222(i) that transfer must be consensual. Even if, 
it was not so clear, the legislative history of the 
doctrine of transfer was such that consent must be 
implied in the Article by necessary intendment. 
(ii) The transfer of a High Court judge fromone High 
Court to another being extraordinary phenomenon, has 
to be made only in public interestand the consent 
must be read into the article otherwise the very 
ll.AIR-1982,SC, 149 
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purpose & object of the Article would be defeated. 
(iii) The transfer without the consent of a judye amounts 
to punishment and involves serious strain & stiyma. 
So, no judge can be transferred without his consent. 
(iv) The transfer of a Hiyh Court judge from one HC to 
another really amounts to a fresh appointment as a 
Judge to the transferee court because such Judge has 
to vacate his office in the original court & has 
also to take oath at the transferred court, though, 
for the purpose of pension, allowances & salary etc 
he continued to be a judge by virtue of legal 
fiction It implied that since no judge could be 
appointed in the first instance against his consent, 
the same principle will apply mutatis mutandis to 
the transferred Judge also. 
(v) The transfer of a Judge without his consent would 
seriously undermine & impair the independence of 
judiciary which is basic feature of our constitution. 
(vi) The decision in Sakalchand case where majority held 
that consent could not be read into Article 222, 
required reconsideration and deserved to be 
overruled. 
The constitutional bench of Seven Judges by 
majority held that prior consent was not necessary to 
transfer a judge. A fear was expressed that if Article 222 
is construed as requiring the consent of the judge to be 
transferred, then, the power of the President can be " 
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"neutralised" by the Judi_)e withholding his consent; as 
Mr.Justice venkatramiah put it, it would "Juris-
prudentially neutralise" this power. 
Durin9 the process of considering above 
mentioned contentions, full & useful account of history of 
the provision relating to the transfer of Judges fromone 
Hiyh Court to another was given. It was said that the 
Draft constitution of India did not contain any such 
provision. The only provision which had some indirect 
bearing on transfer of fudges was the provision. Art 193 
(i)(c). There was a provision in the Govt, of India Act, 
1935 that a judge of a H.C. will vacate his seat by death , 
resignation etc. including transfer to another H_-C. The 
Judge also recollected that an amendment was adopted by the 
constituent Assembly on 16 Nov. 1949 which required the 
President to consult the CJI before exercising the power of 
transfer. 
It was considered useful to place such power of 
transfer in the hands of the President on the ground 
of convenience of general administration. It was for this 
purpose the consultation with the CJI who can be trusted 
to advise the govt, without being affected by localor 
personal prejudice, was considered necessary. 
The learned Judge clarified that if the 
constitution makers had intended that a transfer of a 
Judge should be made only with his consent, this would have 
found express mention in Article 222. 
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Justice Desai also took the view that to 
introduce the words "with consent" into Article 222 would be 
to re-write the constitution which is not permissible. 
Thus, no Judge except Justice Bhagwati could 
read consent into the Article. 
With regard to the third contention that 
transfer without consent amounts to punishment and carries 
strain Judges observed that the provision for extra 
emoluments (monetary compensation) to the transferred judge 
by the constitutional fifteenth Amendment, took away 
completely the idea of punishment in this regard. Since 
then, the transfer was to be made only in public interest, a 
natural corollary was that the transfer was not to be 
considered as a punishment even in disguise. The judges 
relied on Dr_. Ambedkar' s speech in C.A. during the 
discussion on revised draft of Article 222. 
Dr. Ambedkar said: 
"It might be necessary that one Judge may be 
transferred from one court to another in order to strengthen 
the court elsewhere by importing better talent which may not 
be available locally. Secondly, it might be desirable to 
import a new CJ to a EC because it might be desirable to 
have a man unaffected by local politics & burdens. 
Transfers ought to take place only on the ground of 
convenience of general administration. Consequently, we 
have introduced a provision that such transfers shall take 
place in consultation with the CJI who can be trusted 
115 
to advise the Govt, in amanner which is not affected by 
12 local or personal prejudice" 
Reyardiny the fourth contention the hon'ble 
judyes held that the expresssions "Transfer" & "Appointment" 
had not been used interchanyeable in the constitution. The 
takiny of a fresh oath in the transferred post was 
considered to be of no importance or siynificance. On 
transfer, the Judye concerned would cease to be a judge of 
that High Court but he went to the Court to which he is 
transferred as a Judge & not as a newly appointed person, 
who is still to blossom into a judge by taking the 
prescribed oath. Mr. J. Venkatramiah went to the extent of 
holding that there was even no necessity for a fresh oath 
to be taken by a trasferred judge before entering upon his 
duties into the HC to which he is transferred. 
As tothe fifth contention, it was observed that 
transfer without consent would not undermine the 
independence of judiciary because three safeguards have been 
ensured in the matter of the use of President's power to 
transfer, viz :-
(i) Full & effective consultation with the CJI 
(ii) The power to transfer can be exercised in 
public interest; and 
(iii) Judicial Review, insulating the independence of 
judiciary against an attempt by the Executive 
to control it. 
12. C.A.D., Vol.11, p-580. 
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In short, it can be said reyardiny S.P. Gupta 
that there was unanimity amony judyes that transfer should 
be in public interest and not by a way of punishment. But, 
on the issue asto necessity of prior consent of the judye 
to be transferred, all the judges except J. Bhaywati held 
that consent is not a necessary concomitant of Article 222. 
Thus, the Sankalchand Case was followed by upholding the 
view that the non consensual transfers are, therefore, 
within the purview of Article 222 (i). 
Although on the issue of necessity of prior 
consent, justice Bhagwati stood alone in holding that 
consent is necessary concomitant but reyardiny the other 
aspects of minority view . Justice Desai & Justice Fazal 
Ali also concurred with Justice Bhaywati. The minority 
view was that it is a highly dangerous power involving yreat 
hardship and inquiry to the judge transferred including a 
stigma on his reputation in case where the transfer is not 
effected in pursuance of any policy but the judge is 
picked out for transfer on a selective basis. Further the 
power to transfer a judge from one H C to another can be 
exercised only in public interest andthere must be full & 
effective consultation between the president and CJI before 
the decision to transfer is taken. 
Justice Bhagwati advanced many reasons for his 
holdings, two powerful reasons out them were: 
(i) the requirement of the independence of judiciary 
being paramount; and 
(ii) the consultation with the CJI not being enough 
for this purpose. 
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After a thorough analysis of S.P. Gupta 
decision, it appears that none of the reasons which have 
been given by the majority to bring non consensual transfers 
within Article 222 (i) are other than contextual or textual. 
The most important aspect to be considered while 
interpreting Article 222(i) bein the paramount objective of 
preserving judicial independence, the same can not be 
assured by anything that has been said by the majority of 
judges to ensure this; the safeguards which they have 
valiantly struggled to build into Article 222 (i) like 
public interest plus the requirment of prior consultation of 
the CJI, seems totally insufficient. 
S. Rangarajan fears that "what judges of the HC 
would have to reckon within the light of S.P. Gupta case 
is that even if the CJI supports them, the executive may 
still be able to get them transferred and, in that 
eventuality, they would not be left with anything better 
than a doubtful right of litigating the matter before court 
with all the inconvenience, expense, loss of mental peace, 
such litigation would involve. The greater hardship—seems 
to be that those who have to be anxious about whether they 
would be transferred or not would be those who do their 
duty fearlessly and according to their lights as they see tham 
rather than those who may look around and see what course is 
likely to keep them out of such difficulty. Such a 
prospect will not au-_,ur well for the independence of 
Judiciary."13 
13. S.Rangarajan: Non-consensual transfer under Article-222 
a'fter the Judges case" Art Published in JBCI . ,Vol-9 
(2)'1982, pp.-379-380. 
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Thus, one has to read only the judgement of 
Bhagwati J^ ., not only in the present case but also in 
Sheth's case in order to be convinced that thereseemsto be 
no other way of maintaining judicial independence than to 
exclude non consensual transfer from the purview of Article 
222 (i). 
otherwise, as S. Rangaraj an put it: 
"It is surely going to render it still more difficult to 
secure able and upright judges, with the Damocle's sword of 
transfer hanging over judges."14. 
The issue regarding 'Transfer of HC judges' 
again came up for consideration in. 
S.C. Advocates on record Association v/s union of Indians_ 
Where in a momentous judgement, the S.C. ruled 
on the decisive role and primacy of judiciary, interalia in 
the matter of the transfer of HC judges. This now stands 
as the law of the land. 
The learned judges by majority held that 
consent of the transferred judge is not required for either 
the first or subsquent transfer from one High Court to 
another. 
Thus, on the issue of prior consent in 
transfers, the Judges upheld the S. P_. Gupta decision. 
14. I bid, p. 389 
15. AIR-1994, SC, PP-268 
119 
It was also held that the opinion of CJI has 
not mere primacy, but is determinative in the matter of 
transfers. Such power to transfer must however, be exercised 
only in 'Public' Interest. 
Justice Verma while spe^kiny for himself and 
on behalf of Y.Dayal, G.N. Ray, A.S_. Anand & S.P. Bharucha 
J J ., observed. 
"Every power vested in a public authority to subserve a 
public purpose, and must invariably be exercised to promote 
public interest. This guideline is inherent in every such 
provision, and so also in Article 222." ". 
He further added: 
"The provision requiring exercise of this power to transfer 
by the President only after consultation with the CJI, and 
the absence of the requirement of consultation with any 
other functionary, is clearly indicative of the 
determinative nature and not mere primacy of the Chief 
Justice of India's opinion in this matter. The power of 
transfer can be exercised only in 'Public Interest' i.e. for 
promoting better administration of justice throughout the 
Country"17 _ 
As per Justice M.M. Punchchi: 
"In matters of transfers of judges.., the role of the C.J.I, 
is primal in nature and the Executive has a minimal..., 
for consultation envisaged under Article 222 is used in a 
16. Ibid , p. 435. 
17. I bid 
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shrunk form and more as a courtesy, the subject matter leiny 
18 
one relatiny to the inworking of the judiciary" 
In the light of the above discussion it is 
submitted here that the majority opinion in S.P. Gupta, in 
so far as it takes the contrary view relatiny to primacy of 
the role of CJI in transfer matter stands overruled. 
In Second Judges' case, the learned judges also 
made it clear that any transfer made on the recommendation 
of the CJI is not to be deemed to be punitive, and such 
transfer is not justiciable on any ground except on the 
ground that the transfer was made without the recommendation 
of the CJI. It is so because after the adoption of transfer 
policy, and with the clear provision for transfer in Article 
222, any transfer in accordance with the recommendation of 
the CJI cannot be treated as punitive or an erosion in the 
independence of judiciary. 
Justice Ahmadi concurred with the majority on 
transfer issue to great extent but qualified his opinion by 
saying: 
"There is nothing in the language of Article 222 (i) to rule 
out a second transfer of a once transferred judge without 
his consent but ordinarily the same must be avoided unless 
there exist pressing circumstances making it unavoidable 
Ordinarily, a transfer effective in public interest may not 
be punitive but all the same, the CJI must take great care 
to ensure that in the guise of public interest the judge is 
not being penalised."19 
18. I bid P. 453 
19. I bid, P-395 
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It is submitted here that the observationof 
Justice ahmadi leaves an impression that there exists 
somewhere in the mind of the judt^e, the tear as to 
probability of misuse of the power to transfer, even in the 
presence of the above norms specified by the judiciary. 
The S.C_. was confronted by the same issue 
ret^ ardincj 'Power of Transfer' in another case titled case K. 
20 Ashoka Redy V/S Govt, of India & others. 
Where SC followed its own rulings on transfers 
in Second Judges casein verbatim. 
After Second Judyes' case, transfers have 
emeryed as a matter of policy and larye scale transfers of 
judyes from one HC to another then followed. Over 50 High 
Court judyes were involved inthe transfers that took place 
around April 1994. Some, thouyh only a few, have been 
transferred after that too. 
Reyardiny the Second Judyes' ruliny, it is 
submitted here that no doubt, the judiciary has come out at 
its best in minimisiny the probability of misuse of power to 
transfer as it has asserted that CJ I has a determinative, 
not mere primal role to play in matter of transfers. But 
even then, there is still left way, thouyh narrower, for 
usiny this power in punitive manner which, in turn, would 
prove detrimental to the independence of judiciary. 
The above submission stems mainly from the 
20. AIR-1994, 2 S.C.J.,p. 110. 
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vagueness of the concept of 'Public Interest'. This fact 
causes unease and uncertainity reyardiny policy of transfer 
of judges. This is particularly so, in the case of persons 
who soon after their appointment or soon after having 
rendered bold decision, are transfered. What troubles them 
is how & why they were picked upon for transfer and not 
others. in the absence of any clear guidelines, many such 
'transferred' judges harbour the feeling that they have been 
discriminated against. The judges taking bold decisions 
take it as punishment for their uprightness & boldness. 
The most unfortunate fallout of all this is the 
reluctance of many lawyers, who could have lent wisdom and 
experience to the Bench, declining apj-^ointment to it. 
The fear of transfer to another court, creating uncertainity 
in their career on bench seems, now-a-days, the principal 
reason for the fact that Bench no longer attracts the best 
in the profession. 
But this does not, at all, measn that Article 
222 needs removal from the constitution altogether because 
in the present day environment, it is a necessity as 
expressed by S. S. Sodhi in his article: "HIGH COURTS LAID 
LOW?" " whatever the 'public interest' involved 
invariably, transfer for the judge concerned, comes as an 
unwanted move, may even be dreaded, in the context of his 
circumstances. However, the conduct and image of some judge 
can render it imperative that they be removed to another 
court. After the justice Ramaswami fiasco, transfer to 
another court presents, perhaps, the only plausible " damage 
control mechanism" against a judge who, for whatever reason, 
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21 
may have become an embarrasment to the Court." 
Thus, the solution seems to lie somewhere in 
the middle. 
21. H.T. : Feb. 11, 1996 , J. 13 
CHAPTER - VI 
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CHAPTER - VI 
CONCLUSION 
The entire discussion, at a 9lance, is bound to 
leave a genuine impression that one single idea runs through 
the fabric of discussion like a 'Golden Thread". And, the 
idea is that the 'Separationof Judiciary from Executive' is 
the life line of 'Independent Judiciary'. Therefore, in 
order to maintain an independent judiciary, it is, at the 
most, essential to separate it from the undue interferences 
of the Executive which are nothing but political pressures 
in disguise. 
Infact, our founding fathers made it known in an 
emphatic-voice that how much keen they were to have an 
independent judiciary. It is an undeniable fact that if 
independent of the judiciary is to have any meaning, there 
is aboslute need for a set of judges whose sole allegiance 
is to the Constitution and the rule of law and who would be 
able to discharge their duties fearlessly & justly evenin 
times of stress and abnormality. 
Thus, the independence of judiciary is in-
extricably linked and connected with the constitutional 
process of appointment of judges of the higher judiciary and 
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it would be totally illoyical to assume an independent 
judiciary so loni^  as power of appointment vests in the 
Executive. 
The Constituent Assembly spent a considerable 
time in devisinc, a method it adopted was believed to secure 
the appointment of judyes without political pressue. It was 
initially believed that due weight would be yiven to the 
opinion of the CJ I and the CJ of the States. The suyyestion 
made by the federal court that the appointment of a judye 
should be made with the concurrence of the CJ I was rejected 
on the yround that to do so would be to put a veto in the 
hands of one person who, however, eminent was after all, 
subject to the short comings and failures of a human beiny. 
As goes the saying also - 'To err is human ....'. The 
foundiny fathers also did not choose to leave the power of 
appointment in the hands of the President without any check 
because they feared that in that case the tyranny would be 
the sure result. 
Thus,they opted for a middle course by which the 
consultation process with the CJ I was designed as a 
'Compromise Check' on the Executive's discretion in 
appointment matters. 
But, the discussion goes on showing that the 
actual working of the method so devised had been 
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unsatisf acatory. This suygests that Govt, of the day as in 
the Centre always wished to have their way in making 
appointments and in the process of yivincj form to their 
ambition, the 'consultation' with CJ I was reduced to a mere 
retual formulae by the Govt. 
What to say about the Govt., even Judiciary 
itself inflicted wounds onits own independence, when it 
asserted the authority of the Executive over that of its own 
in the matters of appointments in S_.P_. Gupta case. The 
Judges case is the proof of the fact that Judiciary has 
almost handed over the key to the Robber i.e. the Executive. 
While the framers of the Constitution could have 
never intended to give this power to the Executive because 
the Govts, are parties before, the Courts in large number of 
cases. The Union Executive have vital interest in various 
important matters which came for adjudication before the 
apex court. The Executive - in one form or the other is the 
largest single litigant before the Courts. In view of the 
matter, the judiciary being the mediator between the people 
and the Executive, the framers of the Constitution could not 
have left the final authority to appoint the judges of 
higher Courts inthe hands of the Executive. 
Unfortunately, apex Court ignored the above 
logic in Judges' case and asserted that it is the President 
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who has final say in appointment matters. Such position 
continued for 12 years and the repurcussions of such an 
assertion could have been much more fatal, had such 
position been left to continue forever. 
Luckily and to a 9reat surprise, the Judiciary 
woke up from a dormant state of 12 years when it made a 
landmark, revolutionary pronouncement in Second Jud-yes' 
case, where it asserted that it is the CJ I , not the 
President, who is to have and would, infact, have last word 
in 'Appointment & Transfer Matters'. The role of CJ I is not 
mere primal but also determinative in such matters. 
Justice Pandian, in Second Jud9es Case, 
expresses the need of the day inorder to secure an 
independent judiciary as follows : 
"To have an independent judiciary to meet all 
challenges, , the person to be elevated to the 
judiciary must _._ always be weded only to the 
principles of the Constitution and 'Rule of Law'. If 
the selectee bears a particular stamp for the purpose 
of chan<-|iny the cause of decisions bowiny to the diktat 
of his appointiny authority, then the independence of 
judiciary can not be secured notwithstanding the 
guaranteed tenure of office, rights and previlegs, 
safeguards conditions of service & immunity". 
1. S.C. Advocates-on-Record Assn. V/S Unionof India AlR 
1994, SC, p.315. - -
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Thus, the need of the hour was to secure the 
appointment of rit^hteous & fearless u^di-jes - the principle 
may to maintain an independent judiciary. And, to fulfill 
this need efficiently,the apex court came forward to reduce 
the probabilities of political manipulations by reducing the 
role of the President to minimum. In a way, the authority 
and role of President was dwarfed by the learned judyes in 
appointment and transfer matters, in Second Judges Case. 
It is submitted that no doubt, such a 
revolutionary decision have reduced the chances of political 
interferences but chances of Nepotism and Arbitrariness are 
still lin^erinc, on there because after all, CJ I is also a 
human beiny who may resort to favours at times. Meaning 
thereby is that to yive sole authority or decisive say in 
significant matters of 'Appointment of Judges' to CJ I would 
not be sufficient to have a really independent judiciary. 
From time & ayain, there have been proposed some 
suyyestions by Jurists as well as by the Law Commission 
which may prove helpful in securiny the desired end i.e. an 
Independent Judiciary. 
Dr. G.R. Rajayopaul, senior Advocate, SC and 
former law secretary to the Govt, of India, suyyests that 
2_. G.R. Rajayopaul : "Appointment & Transfer of Judyes of 
Hiyher Courts - Art. published in J.B.C.I., Vol. 9(2): 
1982. 
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the better alternative would be to provide for some kind of 
'Judicial Council' consistint^ of the Central Minister, the 
Attorney General of India, the Chief Justice of India, the 
senior - most puisne judc,e of the SC and the President of 
the Supreme Court Bar Association on whose recomendation 
alone, the appointment should be made. This would ensure 
joint participation of all the interests involved and the 
char9e of undue secrecy would be reduced to some extent. The 
Council could consult the C.J. of the Hic^ h Courts concerned 
before arriving at their decision. 
Moreover such an arranyementcould be worked out 
without even havine, the Constitution formally amended for the 
purpose. Such a Council could also deal with the appointment 
of the CJ I, includintj cases where the appointment is not 
intended to L,O by mere seniority. 
H.M_. Seervai-^ also stresses the necessity to 
constitute a Commission for 'Judicial Appointments' on the 
lines of the 'Judicial Service Commission' set up by Section 
55 of the Constitution of Ceylon. 
He su'aiyests that the Commission should consists 
of the CJ I as Chairman and Six other judi^ es drawn from the 
Hiyh Courts. In appointincj judi^ e the HC, the Commission 
3. Seervai : The Emergency, Future Safeguards & the Habeas 
Corpus Case: A Criticism, 1978. 
130 
should consult the CJ of the State but the final decision 
must rest with the Commission. Similarly, the Commission may 
obtain the view of the State Govt. about a proposed 
appointee because facts about him may be known to the State 
which are not known to the judiciary. 
Furthermore, e^ oes on suijL,estin<^  H.M_. Seervai, 
followintj the Ceylon Constitution, it should be made a 
punishable offence to attempt directly or indirectly to 
influence any decision of the Commission. The rule of 
promotion by Seniority must be applied in appointing the CJI 
and the CJ of each Hiyh Court as an essential t^uarantee of 
the judicial independence provided they have at least a 
year's service left before retirement. 
Similarly, Law Commission of India headed by 
Justice D.A. Desai as its Chairman, in its 121st Report once 
suyyested for the creation of All India Body styled as 
National Judicial Service Commission to select jude,es to the 
SC & Hiiyh Courts. The Judicial Commission will send its 
recommendations to the President which shall be bindin^a on 
him. 
These recommendations of Law Commission seems to 
be a pointer to the insufficiency of the then existing 
machinary for appointment of SC & HC judi^es. They further 
4. See Indian Express, June 5, 1988 (Chd. Edn.) 
131 
emphasised that the Govt, should not have a final voice in 
such matters. 
The suyi^estions of Law Commission seems to have 
been implemented to threat extent, in the Second Jud<-,es Case 
where the opinion of the CJ I has been placed above all. 
Our submission is that the out of different 
sut^yestions, the suyyestion made by Dr. Rajayopaul seemsto 
be more sound and practical as it contains the idea of joint 
participation of all the interests involved and if 
implemented , may hopefully lead to a healthy atmosphere. 
So far as the issue of 'Transfer Power' is 
concerned, a yood deal of discussion has been made in the 
present dissertation which tends to show that the provision 
on transfer has been construed in Sankalchand & S.P. Gupta 
decisions to mean that a Hiyh Court judye can be transferred 
from one Hiyh Court to another without his consent; that any 
transfer under the provision canonly be in the public 
interest and no transfer which appears to be penal in 
character will be sustained and that there should be full & 
effective consultation between the two authorities before 
the transfer. 
After S.P. Gupta, the matter reyardiny transfers 
was ayain dealt with in Second Judges' case. 
The Second Judues' Case on the issue of 
132 
'Transfer Power' seems to be, to a c,reat extent, an old mine 
in new bottle. The learned judges maintained the earlier 
position of 'Non-Consensual Transfers' in public interest. 
Theonly difference is that this time, the opinion of CJ I 
was not only yivenprimacy over that of the Executive, but 
was rendered a final voice or last word in transfer matters. 
Inspite of such a landmark decision which 
asserted authority of Judiciary over that of the Executive 
in emphatic voice, the question asto the justification of 
Transfer policy still lingers on and remains unreplied_. 
Although, humeous attempts seems to have been made to 
justify the need of policy but none of them holds its feet 
on the ground. 
The main motive behind the policy is always said 
to be 'National Interyration' but this yround does not carry 
much conviction. Evenif valid, the object can be secured by 
makiny suitable appointments initially for the purpose. 
Another difficulty which finds its mention in S.P. Gupta is 
asto the inconvenience arisiny due to lack of knowledc^eof 
local lancjuaye of the State. The provisionis also justified 
on the yround of 'Public Interest' which also, is the 
concept vayue in itself and yives rise the doubts because in 
a yiven set of circumstances, it may be applied differently 
by different people as is evidenced by the Judges' Case_. 
133 
But, these difficulties do not lead to the 
solution of complete removal of the provision or the policy 
itself because that would amount to 'doini^ away with 
the patient if the disease can't be cured'. 
Moreover in the present day society, it would be 
a mockery of Democracy to remove the policy altoyether. The 
need for its existence has been rightly stressed by S.S. 
Sodhi when he writes : 
"... Conduct of some judge render it imperative that 
they be removed to another court. After Justice 
Ramaswami Fiasco, transfer to another court 
presents, perhaps, the only plausible "damaged Control 
Mechanism" against a Judge who, for whatever reason may 
have become an embarrasment to the Court."^ 
Thus, it would be an 'Qstrich Syndrome' i.e. 
Escapismif one thinks of doing away with the policy. So, the 
wise and reasonable approach is the seek a sound solution to 
the problem with cool head so that judges do not take the 
transfer as Damocle's Sword consistently hanging over their 
heads. 
To achieve above end, there is need to employ 
certain means which are being suggested as follows : 
(i) To follow the sug^ -^ estion made in Judges case that lack 
5. S.S. Sodhi : 'High Courts laid low?' - Art. published in 
H'.T". ; Feb.11, 1996, p.13. 
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of knowledge asto local lan^^uage of the State should be 
considered as a factorin evaluatinc) 'Public Interest'. 
(ii) To build a system of incentives, carefully & dili<-,ently 
to ensure that Judges who are marked out for their 
ability, worth & fearlessness are persuaded to agree to 
their being transferred. This would be a recognition of 
their worth and being needed elsewhere; either this may 
lead them to being appointed later as Chief Justice and 
then being eleve.vated to our highest Court. ^  
(iii) If there are crucial vacancies to be filled up in each 
HC, as the one which is likely to enable that person, 
on account of his seniority to become a CJ, greater 
care should betaken to get an outsider by this means. 
The persons who are actually disappointed by their 
exportation to become a CJ in that HC not being 
fulfilled may, if it is feasible and they could 
otherwise be considered, with their consent, be made a 
CJ in another HC, on if feasible, even elevated to the 
SC if otherwise fit. The person so transferred is 
likely to ^ive off his best in the transferred place 
andmay also look forward legitimately to becoming its 
C J. This would be a far more sensible way of securing 
the needed CJs to manour HCs than by merely ordering 
6. S.Rangarajan : 'Non-Consensual Transfer under 
Article-222 after the Judges Case - Art, published in 
J.B.C.I. , Vol. 9(2) : 1982, p. 390.-
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persons with all the frustration & discontent that these 
transfers breed. They also lead to manoeuvring-, andsuch 
transfers stand the risk of beinij even politicised. 
Obviously, such a course would not be in the best interest 
n 
of the judiciary as a whole. 
Thus, it is hoped that these sutji^estions, if 
implemented, would help the judges in taking transfers not 
as Damocle's Sword but as a way to proi-jressive carreers. 
At last, but not the least, it is submitted that 
for making judicial appointments includin^^ transfers, it is 
desirable that some independent asjency free from the 
Executive's control is created so that political 
manipulations donot find any place in the appointive process 
and an independent judiciary is maintained at any cost. 
Side by side, it is always to remember the words 
of Justice Venkataramiah : 
"The ultimate safeguard for the independence of the 
judiciary has to be sought in the judi^ e himself and not 
outside and that is the inner stren^ -^ th of jud^ e^s alone 
and can save the judiciary". 
Justice J.S. Verma, who is bein>-j looked as 
'Crusader' after the 'Hawala Episode', comments on the 
71 Ibid - pp. 390, 391. 
8. S.P.Gupta V/s President of India (1981) SCC 87 at 917_ 
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'Second Jud^ i^ es Case' as follows : 
"Ever since the supremacy of the executive in the 
selection of jud(jes was removed about three years ayo, 
the judiciary has acquired 9reater responsibility to 
Q 
ensure the right quality of appointments " 
Justice Verma, proceedincj on the lines of 
Justice Venkatramiah, observes : 
"Self-Restraint istheonly healthy check. Any external 
check will be detrimental not only to the independence 
of judiciary but also to the whole constitutional 
scheme. The remedy would be worse than the disease if 
others were allowed to exercise any kind of control 
over judges _. They ( judges) should bear in 
mind the famous line of Shakespeare : 
"It is excellant to have a giant's strength, but it is 
tyrannous to use it like a giant. "-'-'^  
9. India Today : An excerpt from an interview with J.Verma: 
published in March 15, 1996 Issue; p. 122. 
10. Ibid; p. 121. 
B I B L I O G R A P H Y 
BOOKS 
Baxi, Upendra 
Dhawan, Rajeev 
The Indian SC & Politics; (1980)^ 
Justice on Trial : The SC Today; 
72 (1980). 
Jain, M.P, Indian Constitutional Law; 120 
(4th Ed.) (1987). 
4_. Mukherji, P.B_. The Critical Problems of Indian 
Constitution 94 (1967). 
5. Pandey, J.N, Constitutional Law of India; 
20th Ed. (1989). 
Palkhiwala, N, A Judiciary made to measure, 36 
(1973) . 
Shourie, Arun Mrs. Gandhi's Second Rei^n 
(1983) . 
Seervai, H.M. Emer<3ency, Future Safeguards and 
the Habeas Corpus Case : A 
C riticism 58 (1978). 
Seervai, H.M. Constitutional Law of India; 
Vol-II, 2nd Ed. (1979). 
10. Seervai, H.M. Constitutional Law of India; 
Vol-II, (1984). 
I I 
1 1 . S e t a l v a d , M.C. : An i n d e p e n d e n t & a d e m o c r a t i c 
S t a t e , 90. {1977)_. 
Periodicals 
A. Journals 
1. Indian Bar Review, Vol. X(l), 1983. 
2. Int_. Comp. L.Q. , 10 (1981). 
3. Journal of B.C.I., Vol. IX (2), 1982. 
4_. S.C.J. - Vol.1, 1994. 
B. Debates & Reports 
1. C.A.D. - Vol. II 
2. C.A.D. - Vol. VIII, 1948_. 
3_. Rajya Sabha Debataes, Nov. 24, 1959. 
4_. A.I.R., 195 3, Madras. 
5_. A.I.R., 1971, S.C. 
6_. A.I.R. , 1976, S.C. 
7. A.I.E., 1977, S.C. 
8. A.I.R., 1978, S.C. 
9_. A.I.R., 1982, S.C. 
10_. A.I.R., 1994, S.C. 
11. F.C.R. , 1943_. 
12. Law Commission - XIV Report, Vol.-I, 1959. 
13. S . C . R . , 19 5 0_. 
C. Papers & Magzines 
1. Indian Express- June 5, 1988 (Chd. End.). 
2. The Hindustan Times, Feb. 11, 1973. 
Ill 
3. The Hindustan Times, April, 27, 1973 
4. The Hindustan Times, March, 24, 1996_ 
5. The Statesman, April 28, 1973. 
6. The Times of India , March 23, 1996_. 
7. India Today, March 15, 1996. 
********* 
